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INTRODUCTION
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law.
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prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk that a child liv-
ing with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a vari-
ety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were.living
with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin. The question,
however, is whether the reality of private biases and the possible
injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for re-
moval of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.
We have little difficulty in concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.1
We are opposed to transracial adoption as a solution to perma-
nency placement for Black children. We have an ethnic, moral
and professional obligation to oppose transracial adoption. We
are therefore legally justified in our efforts to protect the rights of
Black children, Black families, and the Black community. We
view the placement of Black children in white homes as a hostile
act against our community. It is a blatant form of race and cul-
tural genocide.
2
And caught in the middle are the children.
The topic of trans-racial adoption has generated much rheto-
ric and much study, and will undoubtedly continue to do so.
Heated discussion seems to result because the topic exposes raw
nerves from sociological and political points of view.
The legal arena is not much different, because the topic im-
pacts key normative propositions. First, to what extent does the
legal treatment of trans-racial adoption ensure that dispositional
decisions relating to children awaiting adoption are made in the
"best interests of the child"? Second, to what extent does the
adoption process require us to turn our backs on the concept of the
country as an ethnic "melting pot" and entrench affirmative obli-
gations to acknowledge ethnicity in the legal system? Is it neces-
sary to accept a model which premises cultural preservation on
racial classification, and moreover, does trans-racial adoption con-
stitute an appropriate context for its employment? Conversely,
even if one applauds the Palmore v. Sidoti doctrine,3 which de-
clines to pander to societal racism when deciding upon an appro-
1 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (footnote omitted).
2 Barriers to Adoption: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1985) (statement of William T. Merritt,
President, National Association of Black Social Workers).
3 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
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priate disposition for the child, are we comfortable with the im-
pact that adopting these values will have on a given child?
Surprisingly, there is relatively little recent discussion of the
legal system's response to these questions in the general context of
trans-racial adoptions.4 In particular, with the exception of a stu-
dent Note,5 there has been no discussion whatsoever of the efforts
of three states-Arkansas, 6 California, 7 and Minnesota-to re-
4 See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Poli-
tics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163 (1991) (discussing unique
role race plays in adoption context); James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Di-
vergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best
Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487 (1987-88) (noting that conflict of values be-
tween dominant culture and strong subculture creates problems in trans-racial adop-
tion context); Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in
Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303 (1967-68) (maintaining that
race-based adoption statutes are unconstitutional); Margaret Howard, Transracial
Adoption:Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984)
(arguing that intervention and placement decisions should always be driven by a
"best interests of the child" analysis); Shari O'Brien, Race in Adoption Proceedings:
The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485 (1986) (hypothesizing that use of race as
controlling factor in adoption proceedings hinders rather than promotes well-being of
adoptee child); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and
the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FA . L. 51 (1990-91) (suggesting that best interests analy-
sis may be reasonable in theory but problematic in practice).
5 See Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A Con-
stitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MNN. L. REV. 925 (1993)
(analyzing Minnesota's preference statutes).
6 See ARmv CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993). The section provides:
In all custodial placements ... due consideration shall be given to the child's
minority race or minority ethnic heritage .... In the placement or adoption
of a child of minority racial or minority ethnic heritage ... the court shall
give preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to ... (1) a
relative ... (2) a family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child.
Id.
7 See CAL. FAi. CODE § 8708 (Deering 1993). The statute states:
Where a child is being considered for adoption, the following order of place-
ment preferences regarding racial background and ethnic identification shall
be used... (a) In the home of a relative. (b) If a relative is not available ...
with an adoptive family with the same racial background .... (c) If place-
ment cannot be made under the rules set forth ... within 90 days ... the
child is free for adoption with a family of a different racial background ....
Id.
8 See MXNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993). This section provides:
The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of
children are met by requiring due, not sole, consideration of the child's race
or ethnic heritage in adoption placements .... The court shall give prefer-
ence . . . to (a) a relative . . . (b) a family with the same racial or ethnic
heritage as the child... (c) a family of different racial or ethnic heritage...
that is knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic
heritage.
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spond to the considerations raised by trans-racial adoption by en-
acting legislation which establishes adoption placement priorities
on the basis of race. This Article addresses these concerns by ana-
lyzing the statutory schemes, 9 both from the perspective of
whether they can substantively and procedurally ensure that dis-
positions are made in the best interests of the child, and also from
the perspective of whether such statutes can survive a constitu-
tional challenge. In passing on these issues, one must come to
terms with one's own views on whether pessimism toward the pos-
sibility of eradicating racism justifies a color and community-con-
scious approach to the treatment of trans-racial adoption, and also
whether peaceful multiculturalism is attainable through the rein-
forcement of racial identification. An additional consideration is
whether the claimed benefits of a race-based placement necessar-
ily outweigh the price that might be paid by adopting a scheme to
achieve those benefits. This price is potentially paid not only by
the values of society at large, but also by the integrity of the legal-
social work complex associated with adoption placements. Most
important, the individual child whose placement is in issue also
pays the price.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
A. Demographics
By any standard, formal trans-racial adoptions have had a
brief history in the United States, emerging in the 1950s, flourish-
ing, relatively, in the 60s, and withering (at least as far as domes-
tically born minority babies were concerned), but not completely
Id. The Minnesota statute was named the Minnesota Minority Heritage Protection
Act, but since its provisions have now been extended to cover all races, this title may
be somewhat of a misnomer. See Glynn, supra note 5, at 930 n.20.
9 See Janet Mason & Carol W. Williams, The Adoption of Minority Children: Is-
sues in Developing Law and Policy, in ABA NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR
CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 83,
94-96 (Ellen C. Segal ed., 1985). A few other states have addressed the subject by
adopting or proposing to adopt analogous priority schemes in their relevant depart-
mental manuals. These efforts raise essentially the same questions as are raised by
the statutory schemes. Id. (giving sample of relevant policies); see Bartholet, supra
note 4, at 1189. The enforceability of these policies may depend upon whether they
are embodied in regulations or simply incorporated into practice manuals. Id. at 97.
Their enforceability in fact is another matter. The location of these policies in practice
manuals may hinder public monitoring of the enforcement, or modification of these
policies. Id. Perhaps most problematic is the extent to which these policies may be
adopted without public input.
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disappearing, thereafter.'" The total number of formal adoptions
in the United States was estimated at 72,000 in 1951, about
175,000 in 1970, and 129,000 in 1975, the last year in which the
federal government collected statistics." Thereafter, 1985 esti-
mates put the number of adoptions at around 65,000, but with
substantial statistical errors of as many as 60,000 adoptions. 1 2
Reliable statistics for trans-racial adoptions are even harder to as-
certain. Simon and Altstein indicate that there were 831 trans-
racial adoptions in 1975, a decrease from the all-time high of 2574
in 1971.1 These authors and others maintain that both public
and private agencies are placing children trans-racially, but will
not admit to doing so because of the political considerations
involved.4
Estimates suggest that in 1986 there were some 280,000 chil-
dren in "out-of-home" placement, of whom 34.9% were black.' 5
Certainly, not all of these children were placed out of their homes
for adoption purposes. It has indeed been suggested that in the
same year there was a total of 104,000 adoptions of children of all
races, 51,000 of which involved adoptions by non-relatives. 16
Although these statistics do not indicate the number of minority
children available for adoption, two other studies, one in 1977 and
another in 1983, found that only 37% of black children apparently
10 Macaulay & Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case Study of Expert
Discretion, 1 RES. IN L. AND Soc. 265, 280-88 (1978) (containing description of formal
adoption system in United States, and its inability to resolve problems posed by
trans-racial adoption).
11 R.J. SIMON & H. ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEm FAMILIES 4
(1987) (citing Maza, Adoption Trends: 1944-1975, in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH
NOTES No. 9 (Administration for Children, Youth, and Family, Washington, D.C. Aug.
1984)) [hereinafter SION & ALTSTEN III]: The Simon and Altstein book is the third
in a series presenting a study begun in 1972 of 204 families who adopted children
trans-racially. See R.J. SniON & H. ALTSTEIN, TRANsRACIAL ADOPTION: A FOLLOW-UP
(1977) [hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN I]; R.J. SIMON AND H. ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION (1981) [hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN II].
12 See SIMON & ALTsTEIN I, supra note 11, at 4-5.
13 See SIMON & ALTsTEN III, supra note 11, at 5; see also SIMON & ALTSTEN II,
supra note 11, at 96 (indicating that in 1976 number of trans-racial adoptions rose to
1070).
14 See SIMON & ALTSTEN III, supra note 11, at 5.
15 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1173-74 n.10 (citing Telephone Interview with
Dr. Toshio Tatara, Director of Research and Demonstration Department, American
Public Welfare Association (Jan. 29, 1991)).
16 NATL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FAcTBOOK 60; cf supra note 12
and accompanying text.
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available for adoption were in fact adopted. 17 In 1987, Simon and
Altstein estimated that there were between 33,000 and 40,000
black children in foster care awaiting adoption.'" Another 1986
analysis found that more than half the black children in foster
care had been there for two years, compared with only one-third of
the white children.1 9 Many, perhaps a majority, of the children in
foster care experience more than one placement,20 and conse-
quently their emotional development suffers.21
It has been suggested that in 1984 there were two million
white couples who wished to adopt, 68,000 of whom were willing
to do so trans-racially.2 2 This, as Simon and Altstein point out,
would be sufficient to place all of the black children awaiting adop-
tion.23 Even if the number of black children available for adoption
were double the 1987 estimate of 40,000, however, it appears that
the black community would still be able to absorb them. The fail-
ure of the black community to adopt the black children awaiting
adoption is allegedly one manifestation of the political forces at
work in this arena.
B. Politics
Two political themes dominate the area of trans-racial adop-
tion. The first relates to the perception of the desirability of mak-
ing trans-racial placements. From any perspective, the essence of
the argument is concerned with the virtues of race itself. The sec-
ond theme pertains to the consequences of racism, relating either
17 Id. at 123 (citing WESTAT, INC., NATIONAL STUDY OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF CHIL-
DREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1978); AMERICAN PUB. WELFARE ASS'N, CHARACTERISTICS
OF CHILDREN IN SUBSTITUTE AND ADoPTrvE CARE (1985)).
18 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 5.
19 See NAT'L COMM. FOR ADOPTION, supra note 16, at 126 (citing H. Altstein and J.
Rosenberg, Presentation Before the Third National Conference on Intercultural Fam-
ilies (Oct. 29, 1986).
20 See Howard, supra note 4, at 506 n.11. At one point in New York, 60% of the
children in foster care had experienced more than one placement and 28% of the chil-
dren had experienced three or more placements. Id.; see Smith v. Organization of Fos-
ter Families, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977).
21 See Howard, supra note 4, at 506. While foster care was originally believed to
be preferable to institutionalization, it is, however, considered less attractive than
permanent placement. Id. at 508 (citing, inter alia, Michael S. Wald, State Interven-
tion on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and Termination of Parental
Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 671-72 (1976)).
22 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 6.
23 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 6.
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to rationales for making only intra-race placements or to explana-
tions of why there were apparently insufficient black households
available to adopt black children.
One might have anticipated that the longest running political
theme obstructing trans-racial adoptions would have its roots in
the biases of the white-majority population. Although there are a
few overt manifestations of this theme,2 4 they are far fewer than
initially expected. The reality is that the adoption process did not
need to actively display any racist propensity it might have had,
because the doctrine of "matching," which was widely accepted by
the social work establishment, required that parents should only
be allowed to adopt children who resembled the adoptive parents.
The ostensible rationale for the doctrine was that the parent and
child could better establish a relationship if differences were mini-
mized, although the real reason for the doctrine may have been to
hide the fact that the child was adopted.25 Conversely, when
trans-racial adoption came to the fore in the 1960s, it did so not
because the social work establishment viewed such adoptions as a
vehicle for integrating society, but because it claimed such adop-
tions were a means to advance the best interests of the child.2 6
The political objections to trans-racial adoption emanating
from minority communities found expression in the often repeated
1972 position statement adopted by the National Association of
Black Social Workers:
Black children should be placed only with Black families
whether in foster care or adoption. Black children belong physi-
cally, psychologically and culturally in Black families in order
that they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a
sound projection of their future. Human beings are products of
their environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes
and self concept within their family structures. Black children in
24 See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (noting exis-
tence of Louisiana's statute barring trans-racial adoptions and finally declaring it vio-
lative of Equal Protection guarantees); In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (declaring Texas statute prohibiting inter-racial adoption
unconstitutional).
25 See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 280. Nevertheless, it has been
suggested that there was still a political agenda at work since exceptions were made
to the doctrine of matching generally to permit whites to adopt a black child, not vice
versa. THE NATIONAL Ass'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, INC., PRESERVING BLACK FAM-
ILIEs: RESEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND TE RHETORIC 31 (1986) [hereinafter PRESERV-
ING BLACK FAMLiEs]. The latter result was necessary because "the tradition of Black
racial subordination made such a prospect untenable." Id.
26 See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 284.
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white homes are cut off from the healthy development of them-
selves as Black people.
Our position is based on:
1. the necessity of self-determination from birth to death,
of all black people.
2. the need of our young ones to begin at birth to identify
with all Black people in a Black community.
3. the philosophy that we need our own to build a strong
nation.
The socialization process for every child begins at birth. In-
cluded in the socialization process is the child's cultural heritage
which is an important segment of the total process. This must
begin at the earliest moment; otherwise our children will not
have the background and knowledge which is necessary to sur-
vive in a racist society. This is impossible if the child is placed
with white parents in a white environment.27
This position reflects two themes. First, the advancement of a
black identity through the obstruction of trans-racial adoption is
in the interests of the black community. Race is the basis for the
position taken in this theme. Second, an intra-racial placement is
necessary to protect the child from the consequences of a racist
society. If this latter premise is true, the argument would be con-
sistent with an analysis seeking to advance the best interests of
the child.
The theme which purports that one is dealing with a racist
society is connected to another argument of the opponents of
trans-racial adoption. They view the shortage of minority homes
available to adopt minority children as a reflection of racism.2 s
The argument is that the social work establishment is staffed by
predominantly white social workers who are responsible for
recruiting and approving black adoptive families. 29 In this con-
text, several points are noted: (1) 83% of all child welfare workers
are white, but 30-40% of their case load involves black families;30
(2) the system was only intended to,31 and is only geared to, pro-
27 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 11, at 50 (quoting position paper developed at
the National Association of Black Social Workers' Conference in Nashville, Tenn.,
Apr. 4-9, 1972).
28 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 8-9.
29 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 8.
30 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 8-9 (citing Evelyn Moore, Black
Children Facing Adoption Barriers, NASW NEws, Apr. 1984, at 9).
31 See PRESERVING BLACK FAMILIES, supra note 25, at 31.
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vide white children to white families;32 and (3) as part of this pro-
cess, the social work establishment uses white middle class stan-
dards to screen out lower and working class black families as
potential adopters. 33 Thus, one study found that aspiring black
adoptive families were accepted at a rate of one-quarter of 1% as
against a general national average acceptance rate of 10%. 4
It is unclear that all responsibility for the lack of availability
of minority homes lies at the door of the social work establish-
ment,35 nor is it clear that the complaints just outlined are neces-
sarily a reflection of racism. It is also unclear that the appropriate
response to these complaints requires an adoption scheme that
merely regulates the final disposition rather than other processes
associated with the operation of the adoption establishment.
However, one tantalizing question does emerge: If control of the
adoption process was vested in the white middle class, why did
trans-racial adoptions undergo such a dramatic decline after the
National Association of Black Social Workers publicly opposed it
in 1972?36
II. Tm STATUTORY ScHEMEs
Three states have adopted statutory preference schemes regu-
lating trans-racial adoption. As far as the basic preference struc-
ture is concerned, the schemes of Arkansas and Minnesota are
substantially identical. The California scheme is conceptually
similar, although it displays a number of significant technical dif-
ferences. Of the three, the Minnesota scheme is embedded in the
most extensive legislative framework and has been the subject of
the most litigation. By and large, the analysis in this paper will
focus on the Minnesota scheme. Most of what will be said can be
applied directly to the Arkansas provisions. From time to time,
the technical differences of the California scheme will provide an
interesting basis for comparison.
32 SIMON & ALTSTEIN IH, supra note 11, at 9.
33 SIION & ALTSTEIN HI, supra note 11, at 9. These black families were instead
encouraged to become foster parents. Id.
34 SMION & ALTSTmN III, supra note 11, at 9. The study reported that only 2 of
800 black families applying for adoptive parent status were approved. Id.
35 S ION & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 9.
36 See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 27. According to Rita Simon, the
National Association of Black Social Workers does not represent the beliefs of the
general black population in the United States. Rita J. Simon, Transracial Adoption in
South Africa: Phase 1, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 102, 104 (1990) (indicating that 71% of both
races support trans-racial adoption).
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The Arkansas, California, and Minnesota legislatures require
race or ethnic heritage to be taken into account when placing a
child in foster care. 37 In addition, Minnesota imposes the same
requirements when recruiting foster families;38 when placing ne-
glected children or children in need of protection or services in fos-
ter care where legal custody is transferred to a child placement
agency or county welfare board;39 when transferring legal custody
or appointing a guardian pursuant to a variety of petitions that
may be filed in connection with juveniles; 40 or when appointing a
guardian because parental rights have been terminated and an
individual is given legal custody of the child. 41 A direct discussion
of these latter provisions is somewhat beyond the scope of our
present concerns, as is the legislative treatment of Native Ameri-
can children.4 2 Nevertheless, a number of the issues raised by
these provisions impact on the question of adoption and thus will
be alluded to from time to time.
In the context of adoption, Minnesota requires that a child's
race or ethnic heritage be taken into account by the agency mak-
ing the adoption placement,43 the court reviewing the placement
and in "determining appropriate adoption."44 The legislature's di-
rections to the court read as follows:
Protection of heritage or background. The policy of the state of
Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of children are met
by requiring due, not sole, consideration of the child's race or eth-
nic heritage in adoption placements ....
In reviewing adoptive placement, the court shall consider prefer-
ence, and in determining appropriate adoption, the court shall
give preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to
(a) a relative or relatives of the child, or, if that would be detri-
37 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (Deering
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.071 (West 1993).
38 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072 (West 1993).
39 Id. § 260.191.
40 Id. § 260.181(3).
41 Id. § 260.242.
42 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.2(b)(5), 11401(e), 16507.5(a)(4) (West
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.3500-.3579 (West 1993). Arkansas has no specific pro-
visions. For a comprehensive discussion of the impact on a Native American child's
best interests of a system establishing jurisdictional priorities in custody disputes on
the basis of a child's tribal affiliation, see David S. Rosettenstein, Custody Disputes
Involving Tribal Indians in the United States, in PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY
597 (John M. Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993).
43 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West 1993).
44 See id. § 259.28(2).
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mental to the child or a relative is not available, to (b) a family
with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or if that is
not feasible, to (c) a family of a different racial or ethnic heritage
from the child that is knowledgeable and appreciative of the
child's racial or ethnic heritage.
If the child's genetic parent or parents explicitly request that the
preference described in clause (a) or in clauses (a) and (b) not be
followed, the court shall honor that request consistent with the
best interests of the child.4"
When enacted in 1983, the statutory provisions required the
court or the child placement agency to obey the race-based prefer-
ence structure only when considering the adoption of children of
minority racial or ethnic heritage. The Arkansas statute is still in
this form, but the Minnesota statute's restriction to minority chil-
dren was eliminated in 1992,46 after the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals took the position that the original version of the statute was
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. This change
neatly highlights the conflict between the social-query, sociologi-
cal-premises underpinning the legislation and the political
premises underpinning the constitutional analysis.
The principal California provision reads as follows:
Where a child is being considered for adoption, the following or-
der of placement preferences regarding racial background and
ethnic identification shall be used, subject to this section and sec-
tion 8709, in determining the placement of the child:
(a) In the home of a relative.
(b) If a relative is not available, or if placement with avail-
able relatives is not in the child's best interest, with an
adoptive family with the same racial background or ethnic
identification as the child. If the child has a mixed racial or
ethnic background, placement shall be made with a family
of the racial or ethnic group with which the child has the
more significant contacts.
(c) If placement cannot be made under the rules set forth in
this section within 90 days from the time the child is relin-
45 Id. § 259.28(2). The statute further requires that if the child's genetic parents
express a religious preference with respect to the child's placement then that prefer-
ence has to be accommodated within the hierarchy of race-based placements specified
in the statute. Id. Child placement agencies are required to conform to an identical set
of priorities when making adoption placements. Id. § 259.255.
46 See 1992 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 577 §§ 4,5 (West); AR. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
102 (Michie 1993).
47 See In re D. L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 412-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affd on other
grounds, 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992).
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quished for adoption or has been declared free from parental
custody or control, the child is free for adoption with a fam-
ily of a different racial background or ethnic identification
where there is sensitivity to the child's race, ethnicity or cul-
ture. The child's religious background shall also be consid-
ered in determining an appropriate placement. Unless it
can be documented that a diligent search meeting the re-
quirements of section 8710 for a family meeting the place-
ment criteria has been made, a child may not be placed for
adoption with a family of a different racial background or
ethnic identification pursuant to this subdivision.
48
These preference rules need not be followed for "good cause,"
which must be based on one or more of the following
considerations:
(a) Request of the parent or parents.
(b) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child.
(c) The child is legally free for adoption for a period exceeding 90
days during which a diligent search was conducted, and no fam-
ily meeting the placement preference criteria is available for
placement ....
(d) Application of these rules... would not be in the child's best
interest.4
9
On its face, the California provision is conceptually similar to
those of Minnesota and Arkansas. Basically, it too prefers an ini-
tial placement with a relative, or failing that, with a person of the
same "racial background or ethnic identification" as that of the
child, or failing that, with a family evincing sensitivity to the
child's race, ethnicity or culture. There is, however, one immedi-
ate point of distinction between the Minnesota and California
statutes. The Minnesota provision declares it to be in the child's
"best interests" to be placed subject to the scheme.50 The Califor-
nia Code specifically acknowledges that a placement in terms of
the scheme may not be in the child's "best interests."5 1
48 CAL. FAm. CODE § 8708 (Deering 1993). A "diligent search" requires the agency
in question to use all appropriate resources in a directed effort to recruit a family
meeting the placement criteria through "(1) the use of all appropriate intra-agency
and interagency, state, regional and national exchanges and listing books, (2) child-
specific recruitment in electronic and printed media coverage, and (3) the use of
agency contacts with parent groups to advocate for specific waiting children." CAL.
FAm. CODE § 8710 (Deering 1993).
49 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (Deering 1993) (limiting request provided by subsection
(a) to one emanating from "birth" parent, as defined in § 8512).
50 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993).
51 See CAL. FAm. CODE § 8709 (Deering 1993).
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III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
A. As Perceived by the Social Sciences
To date, a number of studies concerning trans-racial adoption
have been conducted.52  The literature describing these studies
tends to describe the results as mixed, inconclusive, and conflict-
ing. In fact, virtually without exception, and subject to qualifica-
tions to be described below, the studies suggest that trans-racially
adopted children do no worse than intra-racially adopted children,
and, in some instances, do better than intra-racially adopted
children. 3
Initial objections to the studies were that, since trans-racial
adoption was at a stage of relative infancy, the studies had by and
large been restricted to young children.54 It was postulated that
the problems of trans-racial adoption would not emerge until the
adopted children reached adolescence.55 However, although there
are fewer studies covering this age group, they tend to confirm the
conclusion that trans-racial adoption is, from a social sciences
point of view, a viable option for minority children.
5 6
If this presentation is true, where does the vehement opposi-
tion of the National Association of Black Social Workers 57 spring
from? There are a number of lines of analysis.
52 See SIMON & AiSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 145-46 (providing bibliography of
most major trans-racial adoption studies).
53 See Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, in CENTER FOR
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, THE DAvID AND LuciLE PACKARD FOUNDATION, 3(1) THE
FUTURE OF CHMDREN 104 (1993) (providing overview of studies); see also Perry, supra
note 4, at 98-100. Perry points out that most researchers suggest that where possible
minority children should be placed in minority homes. Id. at 100, 111-12. Generally
speaking, virtually none of the studies provide a foundation for this recommendation.
Even where the studies indicate that trans-racial placements may give rise to
problems on an individual basis, statistical analyses do not suggest that such place-
ments are inherently more problematic than intra-racial placements. Id. at 98-100.
Obviously, an intra-racial placement defines the race-related issues out of existence
and in this sense alone it is a "better" solution. But, "better" in this context relates to
issues impacting on the adult community, not necessarily on what is good for the
child. Id.
54 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 4, at 100.
55 See Perry, supra note 4, at 100.
56 See, e.g., William Feigelman & Arnold R. Silverman, The Long-Term Effects of
Transracial Adoption, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 588 (1984); RUTH G. McRoY & Louis A.
ZURCHER, JR., TRANSEACIAL AND INEACiAL ADOPTEES (1983); J.G. SHIREMAN, GROWING
Up ADOPTED: AN EXAmINATION OF MAJOR ISSUES (1988); SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra
note 11.
57 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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First, the opposition may reflect the consequences of drawing
inappropriate conclusions from the social workers' experiences. It
is true, for example, that at least one study58 has specifically sug-
gested (but not within the limits of statistical significance) that
Afro-American trans-racial adoptees (as distinct from both Colom-
bian and Korean trans-racial adoptees who were also included in
the study) might have poorer adjustments than intra-racial
adoptees.5 9 The sorts of cases reflected in the sample that led to
this result might be similar to those in the social workers' experi-
ence which led the social workers to conclude that trans-racial
adoptions were undesirable. The study went on, however, to iso-
late the various factors that might have been contributing to the
maladjustment. Only two factors were relevant: the intensity of
opposition among family and friends to the trans-racial adoption,
and the age of the child at placement.60 As between the two,
"[r]ace difference and racial antagonism are not completely inert
factors in influencing the outcome of a transracial adoption. Yet,
they are overshadowed by the significance of factors associated
with the child's age and long delays in his or her eventual adoptive
placement."61 The authors also point out that "[t]he race factor
itself proved to have no statistically significant value in account-
ing for the differences in adjustment scores."62
This study and line of analysis suggest that when the social
workers reject trans-racial adoptions outright, they are, almost
literally, throwing the baby out with the bath water. The studies
indicate that there is nothing inherently detrimental in a trans-
racial adoption.63 Obviously, if the family screening process re-
flects substantial opposition to the adoption among immediate
family and friends, the aspiring adoptive parents should be con-
sidered unsuitable candidates for the placement. Specific problem
environments do not, at least based on the studies, justify aban-
doning the concept of trans-racial adoption.64 Furthermore, spe-
cific problem environments do not in themselves justify aban-
58 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 594-96.
59 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 595; see also Bartholet,
supra note 4, at 1182.
60 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 596-98.
61 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 597-98.
62 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 597.
63 See McRoy & ZURCHER, supra note 56, at 144; SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra
note 11, at 116-18, 140-41; Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 601.
64 See Silverman, supra note 53, at 117.
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doning the fundamental premises of a legal system based on race-
free classifications. The problems may reflect defects in the social
services delivery system, but at least in the context of this aspect
of the analysis, they do not reflect the inadequacies of the legal
system.
More important, the study indicates that if the legal or ad-
ministrative infrastructure requires that trans-racial adoption be
considered only as a last resort, when all other placement options
have proven to be unavailable, that infrastructure is laying the
foundation for a self-fulfilling prophecy of a trans-racial adoption
with a maladjusted adoptee 5 Furthermore, the study implies
that a suitable and timely trans-racial adoption represents a bet-
ter option for the child than an "in-racial" adoption that is delayed
until a suitable placement is found.6
The second line of analysis flowing from the National Associa-
tion of Black Social Workers' objections takes a different direction.
Their objections, in one sense, seem to assert that within the con-
text of a trans-racial placement a minority child is incapable of
developing a sense of self-esteem or self-concept. Although the
studies reviewing this reasoning tend to refute it, 67 this does not
seem to be the primary focus of the National Association of Black
Social Workers' position. The apprehension seems to be that if the
children develop racial identities at all, they develop inappropri-
ate identities. As was suggested earlier,68 there are really two
themes at work here.
The first theme seems to suggest that it is necessary for the
child to be given an in-racial adoption placement in order to de-
velop a racial identity for the purposes of advancing the interests
of the race as a whole.69 This argument may have independent
merit in the political arena. In the context of the best interests of
a particular child, it has none. To the extent that the argument
precludes a trans-racial placement, either at all, or at least one
made in a timely manner (because an in-racial placement is not
available at the time the child needs placing), the argument repre-
sents the position that the benefits which inure to this particular
65 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 598.
66 See Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 598.
67 See, e.g., McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 56, at 122; SIMON & ALTSTEIN III,
supra note 11, at 112.
68 See supra text accompanying note 27.
69 Leon Chestang, The Dilemma of Biracial Adoption, 17 Soc. WoRK 100, 103
(1972).
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child by preserving and advancing racial group interests as a
whole outweigh any detriment that the child may suffer by not
being placed in a timely manner, or at all, on an intra-racial or
trans-racial basis. However, the position might be reformulated
in a more positive vein. The position would postulate that if an
intra-racial placement were available, at the time the child
needed it, this would be a preferred placement, and one which
would be in the child's best interests.° Of course, the position's
premise is still open to question. But at least this recharacteriza-
tion would be a far cry from one requiring a blanket prohibition
against trans-racial placements, or a race-generated delay pend-
ing an in-racial placement.
The second theme is more problematic. The argument here is
that because society is generally racist, a best interests of the
child analysis dictates an in-race placement because intra-race ac-
culturation is the only viable vehicle for providing the minority
child with the necessary resources for social survival v.7  Again, the
70 See Bowen, supra note 4, at 528-30 (regarding adoption of blacks, "Wihere no
bloodline member can step in, qualified non-related blacks should be given preference
over whites."); Perry, supra note 4, at 125 (asserting that child should be placed in
any available home regardless of racial differences where no intra-race home is
available).
71 See Chestang, supra note 69. This work is misapplied routinely. The article in
question is not a social science research piece, but a social philosophy essay. Id. at
101. While the author suggests that trans-racial adoptive parents will not be able to
impart necessary social skills, his primary concern is to pose the questions, without
the technical relevancy of the questions ever having been established. Subsequent
work then assumes the questions are relevant. See McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 56,
at 139-40. Thereafter, the concept of trans-racial adoption itself is criticized by virtue
of the conclusions reached by this subsequent work, while the critics ignore the under-
lying issue of relevancy. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, CONN. COMPREHEN-
SrVE PLANNING Div., STATE OF CONNECTICUT, A STUDY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN
CONNECTICUT 19-20 (1988). In fact, Chestang's primary concern is that the children
should not be left without a permanent home. See Chestang, supra note 69, at 101-04.
The implication is that given the choice between displaced children and trans-racial
adoption, the latter is to be preferred. He concedes, somewhat reluctantly, that "these
children, if they survive, have the potential for becoming catalysts for society in gen-
eral." Id. at 105. In analyzing the legal treatment of transracial adoption and the
social consequences of the political environment, the author observes that the child
will be subjected to particular pressure from some segments of the minority commu-
nity who will treat the child as a traitor. Id. at 104; see Perry, supra note 4, at 104
(describing efforts at defining relevant survival skills); see also In re R.M.G. 454 A.2d
776, 802 (D.C. 1982) (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman noted, "A healthy inte-
grated personality involves one's having a stable concept of self as an individual as
well as a group (black) identity." Id. at 802 n.11 (quoting JOYCE LADNER, MIXED F I-
LIES 104 (1977)). The judge's authority would carry more weight had the statement
not been taken out of context. Actually, Ladner was drawing an adverse distinction to
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cost-benefit components of this proposition must be closely ex-
amined. In this situation, in which a timely in-race placement is
not available, and a trans-racial placement is either precluded or
must at least be delayed until the prospect of an in-race placement
appears as impossible, the proposition encompasses the position
that the harm suffered by a child due to a lack of the survival
skills necessary in a racist society outweighs the harm suffered by
the child through prolonged or indefinite institutionalization or
temporary placements. 72 The most that can be said about this dis-
sected version of the proposition is that it has not been refuted.
Similarly, neither has it been proved. 3 Only the group of current
trans-racial adoptees can vindicate the thesis. To the contrary,
however, the best evidence is that they are well on the way to re-
futing it.7 4 Current trans-racial adoptees seem to have developed
a means of dealing with the racism they do encounter.75 Only a
long-term analysis will determine whether these methods of cop-
ing are bought at an excessive cost relative to the disposition al-
ternatives other than trans-racial placement. 6 A best interests
analysis must then ask whether it is more desirable to prohibit
further trans-racial adoption pending analysis of the long-term
risks, or more desirable to run these risks by allowing such place-
the 1960s and early 70s, during which period, in her view, as part of a necessary
process, an excessive emphasis had been placed on group identity as distinct from
individual identity. LADNER, supra, at 103-04.
72 From both philosophical and practical points of view, even the most aggressive
proponents of intra-race placements acknowledge the underlying dilemma. See
Amuzie Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of Black Children, 20 Soc. WORK 296, 297
(1975) (asserting that choice between two alternatives should be made by blacks); see
also Perry, supra note 4, at 110 (discussing notion that black parents may be in better
position to transmit survival skills and knowledge to black children).
73 Even a staunch opponent of trans-racial adoption has acknowledged this. See
Bowen, supra note 4, at 507 ("[W]hile it cannot be said on the basis of scientific data
that transracial adoption is unsuccessful, it also is not the case that it has been
proven successful."). The author's position is that, at least as far as hard-to-place
black children are concerned, for the present and short-term future (until such time
as further steps can produce intra-race placements for such children), "should a white
family want to adopt these children, they should be encouraged; the long-run analysis
is that the trauma and lack of family affection is more devastating than the denial of a
home altogether, Black or White." Id. at 511.
74 See McRoy & ZURCHER, supra note 56, at 138-41; SIMON & ALTSTEIN HI, supra
note 11, at 114-17; Feigelman & Silverman, supra note 56, at 601; Penny R. Johnson,
et al., Transracial Adoption and the Development of Black Identity at Age Eight, 66
CHILD WELFARE 45, 52 (1987).
75 McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 56, at 140; Johnson et al., supra note 74, at 52.
76 See McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 56, at 138-41; Johnson et al., supra note 74,
at 53-54.
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ments, when confronted with the known risks associated with the
inability to make an intra-race placement, either in a timely fash-
ion, or at all.77
B. Within the Statutory Scheme-and Despite It
Minnesota requires that both adoption placements and adop-
tion decrees be made in the best interests of the child.78 The state
espouses the widely held position that adoption is a creature of
statute, and the court's authority is therefore measured by the
statute.79 In this context, the Minnesota statutory provisions con-
tain a legislative determination that it is in the best interests of
the child to make adoption placements or decrees with due consid-
eration of the child's racial or ethnic heritage.80 This requirement
in turn triggers a race-based disposition preference structure.8 '
Conversely, refusal to place a child for adoption or to grant an
adoption decree still involves a disposition, even by default. An
alternative disposition, for example, placing the child in foster
care, may trigger an alternative statutory standard, and in Min-
nesota, this alternative disposition may itself require considera-
tion of the child's racial or ethnic heritage.8 2
In addition, however, Minnesota courts seem to be willing to
inject into the process, at least to the point at which the statuto-
rily controlled disposition does occur, the common law require-
ment that the child's best interests be determined independently
of the race-based scheme. 83 In a technical sense, this line of devel-
opment is interesting from two points of view.
77 See Chimezie, supra note 72, at 300-01.
78 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.255, 259.28 (West 1993).
79 In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1957) ("Adoption was unknown at com-
mon law, and therefore we must go to the statute from which the right to adopt an-
other's child derives its authority."); see In re Santos, 195 P. 1055, 1056 (Cal. 1921)
("[Aldoption 'exists in this state only by virtue of the statute' .....
80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 78.
82 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.071 (West 1993) (providing for consideration
of foster child's race or ethnic heritage to satisfy child's best interests).
83 Thus, Minnesota's statute requires the Commissioner of Human Resources to
consent to an adoption before it can be granted. The law requires that the consent not
be unreasonably withheld. However, where the County Bureau of Social Services ar-
gued that the race-based statutory preference scheme compelled the determination
that the Commissioner's refusal to consent to an adoption was reasonable because the
proposed adoption did not follow the statutory preference scheme, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals rejected the argument. The court took the position that a decision
contrary to the best interests of the child would be unreasonable per se and, further,
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First, the Minnesota Supreme Court may ultimately conclude
that the statutory preference scheme cannot be allowed to con-
sume the best interests analysis even in the context of the disposi-
tion apparently regulated by the statute. In this regard, there is a
substantial risk that any "best interests" analysis will be over-
whelmed by the preference scheme. The various factors embodied
in the analysis of where the best interests of the child may lie can-
not be separated from the physical characteristics of the putative
adoptive parent or parents. If the statutory preference scheme
controls the disposition, the tail may truly wag the dog-unless
we are convinced that the race-based disposition scheme is of such
overwhelming importance that it ought to control the best inter-
ests analysis.
In this connection, the Minnesota Supreme Court has ac-
cepted the proposition that regardless of Minnesota's statutory
preference scheme, there is a strong preference for permanent
placement of the child with relatives, and that such a placement is
presumptively in the best interests of the child on the basis of a
common sense notion that blood relatives are most likely to look
out for one another's interests.8 4 This premise seems dubious
when invoked to defeat the efforts of an unrelated person who is
going to much trouble and expense to overcome the placement ef-
forts of the social work establishment, whose position is reinforced
by a statutory race-focused placement scheme. The premise is
equally troubling when it is used to justify the priority in the stat-
utory preference scheme accorded to relatives. The very character
of the preference scheme indicates that the concept of relative is
used in the scheme not as a surrogate for identifying individuals
likely to hold dear the interests of the child, but as a surrogate for
identifying individuals who have a racial or ethnic heritage in
common with that of the child.85 These objections, in and of them-
that where parental rights had been terminated, the judicial branch had "an in-
dependent interest, and significant independent authority, to guard the welfare of
children...." In re S.T., 497 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also In re
D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992).
84 See In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 380.
85 See Mnm. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993). Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme
Court was forced to introduce the common-law preference for relatives in the context
of a case in which the statutory preference only accorded a preference to relatives
when the placement of a child of minority race or minority heritage was under consid-
eration, and the court of appeals had already concluded that the statutory scheme
was unconstitutional on that account. See In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 379. The statu-
tory scheme was subsequently amended, deleting the reference to minority, but other-
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selves, do not necessarily imply that considerations of race by a
court are inappropriate. They are objections to a scheme which
allows a proxy for racial considerations to dominate the child's
placement.
There is a second consequence flowing from the injection of a
common-law analysis. Here, a construction of the statutory
scheme permits the independent invocation of a common-law best
interests analysis in which context the court may have to consider
race-based issues. In this regard, one should remember that the
analysis is not occurring in functional isolation. If the price of ad-
hering to a race-based priority system, because a suitable adoptive
family of the appropriate race is not available, is at best delay and
at worst nonadoption, the best interests analysis should incorpo-
rate an evaluation of these costs against the purported benefits of
the race-based placement. Minnesota's statutory scheme contains
no specific provisions requiring consideration of these issues. The
most that can be said is that the statutory scheme permits the
preference order to be abandoned in the face of "good cause to the
contrary."8 6 However, preliminary indications are that the Min-
nesota courts are not going to be overly zealous in setting aside
the statutory priorities on the grounds of "good cause," at least
when it can be demonstrated that the detriment caused to the
child would more than likely be only temporary, and that an avail-
able alternative placement was otherwise in the child's best
interests.8 7
The relationship between the concerns of the California stat-
ute and the best interests of the child is perhaps as obscure as
that of the Minnesota statute, but for different reasons. In Cali-
wise leaving its race-based concerns and dispositional priorities intact. See 1992
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 557 (West); see also supra text accompanying note 46.
86 See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993).
87 See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 380-81. The foster parents who had looked
after the child for two years sought to adopt the child in the face of a competing adop-
tion petition from the maternal grandparents. Id. at 376. The foster parents were
white, the child was born to an African-American mother. Id. at 377. The trial court
received expert testimony stating that severance of the foster parents' bond with the
child would cause harm because they were the only parents the child had ever known.
Id. at 378. The court, however, followed the testimony of the grandparents' experts
stating that this type of damage is temporary and heals well in "most cases." Id.
Thus, in the interests of the priority system, the child was exposed to risks that would
have not otherwise been present. At issue is the unresolved question of whether the
preference system, in turn, avoids other risks, and whether the risks avoided offset




fornia, unlike Minnesota, there is no express declaration of state
policy regarding the interests of the child as far as issues of race
are concerned, apart from the statutory preference scheme itself.
Moreover, although the California statute was never restricted in
its application to minority races alone, the provision itself sug-
gests that when priority is accorded to placement with a relative,
this priority is for the purpose of meeting race-related concerns. 88
Nevertheless, the statute does provide that a placement with a
relative is not to be preferred if it is not in the child's best inter-
ests.8 9 This suggests that, at least in California, considerations
going to the child's best interests that are both race-related, as
well as unrelated to race, may be taken into account in deciding to
dispense with a placement with relatives.
Moreover, the California statute acknowledges that a search
for race-based placements may produce delays. Accordingly, the
statute provides that in the event that a same-race family cannot
be found within ninety days of the child being freed for adoption, a
placement is permitted with a different-race family sensitive to
the child's race, ethnicity, and culture.90 It is only a recent
amendment to the Minnesota statute which has to some extent
restricted a search for a suitable race-based placement from block-
ing any other placement. 9'
Finally, unlike Minnesota, which permits the preference sys-
tem to be abandoned for "good cause" but fails to explain "good
cause," the California statute spells out what good cause might
be.92 In California, one reason for not following the race-based
preference system is that it would "not be in the best interests of
the child."93 This at least suggests that in the eyes of the Califor-
88 See CAL. FAu. CODE § 8708 (Deering 1994).
89 Id. § 8708(b) ("If a relative is not available, or if placement with available rela-
tives is not in the child's best interest, [the child should be placed] with an adoptive
family with the same racial background or ethnic identification as the child.").
90 Id. § 8708(c).
91 Although § 259.455 of the Minnesota Code requires that a child placing agency
make "special efforts to recruit an adoptive family from among the child's relatives...
[or] families of the same racial or ethnic heritage," the statute's recent amendment
provides that this requirement will be satisfied "if the efforts have continued for six
months after the child [has] become[ ] available for adoption or if special efforts have
been 'satisfied and approved' by the court." Act of May 17, 1993, ch. 291, § 14, 1993
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1028, 1082 (West). Obviously, specification of the period of time
beyond which racial issues cannot block the child's placement involves a more than
somewhat arbitrary judgment. See Perry, supra note 4, at 124.
92 See CAL. FAhi. CODE § 8709 (Deering 1993).
93 Id.
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nia legislature, a race-related placement is not of such compelling
moment that it can be allowed to overwhelm the other considera-
tions going to a best interests analysis. The issue of how race does
relate to these other considerations, however, is by no means
clear.
C. Within the Administrative Infrastructure
There are many different pathways leading to a final decree of
adoption. The child's parents may have died or voluntarily sur-
rendered their child for adoption, or their rights may have been
terminated in an adversarial proceeding. Generally, however,
there is one constant factor in these various processes: the pres-
ence of the state's social work bureaucracy. Sometimes its role is
somewhat remote, perhaps having been restricted to drawing up
the rules under which a state licensed child placement agency fa-
cilitates the adoption. Sometimes the presence of the state's social
work establishment is more immediate, such as when the state
has legal custody and guardianship of the potential adoptee. The
purpose of this subpart is to consider how the social work system
might function when attempting to make decisions in the best in-
terests of the child, while implementing the statutorily mandated
race-based preference system.
In Minnesota, the adoption process generally requires a re-
port to the court from the Commissioner for Human Services,
which report is to include the recommendation whether to grant
the petition.94 The statute appears to envisage that the Commis-
sioner will have received a report from the appropriate county
welfare board.9 5 The court hearing the adoption petition also has
the authority to refer the matter for a report on the proposed
adoption to either a licensed child placement agency or the county
welfare department.96 In preparing their reports, both the Com-
missioner and the child placement agency or the county welfare
department are required to ascertain whether the proposed home
meets the race-based preference standards.9"
If this were all that these bodies had to do, the legal control of
this reporting process might be a manageable task. The statutory
94 See MiN'm. STAT. ANN. § 259.27(1) (West 1993).
95 Id.
96 Id. § 259.27(2) (noting that designation of agency depends on manner in which
child entered adoption system).
97 Id. § 259.27(1), (2).
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mandates, however, do not end there. The Commissioner is re-
quired to investigate the conditions and antecedents of the child to
ascertain whether the child is a proper subject for adoption, and to
make appropriate inquiry to ascertain whether the child and the
home are "suited" to one another.98 Either the agency or the
board must similarly investigate the "environment and anteced-
ents of the child and of the home of the petitioners."9 9 The statute
allows the reports to disapprove of the adoption and to recommend
to the court that the petition be dismissed. 100
In light of the ability of the various reports to lay the founda-
tion to reject the proposed adoption, statutory preference schemes
such as Minnesota's raise a number of concerns relating to the
advancement of the adoptee child's best interests. First, what is
the relative significance of determinations made under the prefer-
ence scheme vis-a-vis other factors such as the "environment" of
the child or the proposed adoptive home? Second, when there is
discretionary decision-making involved in preparing a report,
what legal constraints do or ought to define the scope of that dis-
cretion? Third, what is the nature of the process in the course of
which the discretion is exercised and the various factors are
weighed? In asking these questions, it should be borne in mind
that the issue is not simply one involving the best interests of the
child, a complex enough question in itself, but is one which also
involves accounting for the factor of race, replete as it is with polit-
ical and legal overtones. The obscurity of the Minnesota scheme
highlights some of the complexities involved.
As to the first question, the Minnesota statute commences
with a general declaration of policy which requires "due" consider-
ation of the child's race or ethnic heritage in adoption place-
ments.10 1 This declaration precedes, and appears to be independ-
ent of, the race-based preference scheme that follows it.
Nevertheless, the provisions requiring reports from the Commis-
sioner, welfare board or placement agency only direct them to as-
certain whether the home meets the preferences set out in the
98 See id. § 259.27(1).
99 See MN-N. STAT. ANN. § 259.27(2) (West 1993). The Arkansas provision is simi-
lar. ARm CODE ANN. § 9-9-212(b) (Michie 1993).
100 MmN. STAT. ANN. § 259.27(1), (2) (West 1993). The California statute provides
for reports to the court in both state-sponsored and private agency adoptions, but
gives no indication as to the possible content of such reports. See CAL. F m. CODE
§ 8715 (Deering 1993).
101 See supra text accompanying note 45.
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subsequent paragraph of the same section of the statute. Does
this mean that the Commissioner or these other bodies are re-
stricted to a technical consideration of these preferences? If they
are required to consider the declared policy, what is "due consider-
ation"? Moreover, in this regard, what is the relationship between
the preference section and the declaration of policy in the para-
graph preceding it? Does the preference section apply only when
there are potentially competing adoptive parents whose claims are
to be accorded a priority on the basis of the statutory preference
scheme? 10 2 If the preference section only applies in competitive
situations, but the Commissioner or other bodies can or must con-
sider the declared policy, what role does this declaration play
when the only petitioners seeking to adopt the child are of a differ-
ent race? Does the policy require that they disapprove the pro-
posed adoption? Of course, since the statute does not directly de-
clare what "due consideration" is, this conclusion is by no means
axiomatic.
As to the second question, suppose there are competing adop-
tion petitions. The statute which refers consideration of the adop-
tion to the Commissioner and the reporting bodies requires the
court to follow the preference order in the "absence of good cause
to the contrary."10 3 Does this mean that the Commissioner and,
especially, the reporting bodies, as part of their reporting analysis,
may or may not identify "good cause" for avoiding the preference
structure? If they can or ought to make such an identification,
what is "good cause"? California, at least, has included a statu-
tory description of factors constituting "good cause" for not follow-
ing the preference scheme. Any one of the following will suffice: a
request from a parent not to follow the scheme-no doubt in-
tended to facilitate concealing the pregnancy from "relatives"; the
extraordinary physical and emotional needs of the child; the ab-
sence of a preferred family after a diligent search for more than
ninety days from when the child became free for adoption; and the
best interests of the child.1
0 4
Further, in the absence of adoption by a relative, the Minne-
sota scheme next requires consideration of an individual who is of
the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, unless it is "not
102 See Glynn, supra note 5, at 948-49 (discussing problem in context of court's
decision-making process, not as part of administrative process).
103 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993).
104 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (Deering 1993).
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feasible."10 5 Is "feasibility" simply a function of physical exis-
tence, as suggested by the California statute's use of the term
"available,"'0 6 or does it involve a qualitative evaluation as well?
If it does, is it permissible for the Commissioner or reporting body
to perform this evaluation? Finally, in the absence of petitioners
in the two higher ranked groups, the statute permits considera-
tion of a family of a different racial or ethnic heritage if it is
"knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic her-
itage."10 7 Is this restricted to competitive situations vis-a-vis fam-
ilies of another race who are not so knowledgeable, or is it the
outer limit of the state's declared policy requiring due considera-
tion of race, so that a family of a different race which is not so
knowledgeable is always to be ousted from consideration? Simi-
larly, under the California statute, if as a last resort, a family of a
different race which is "sensitive" to the child's race, ethnicity, or
culture cannot be found, does the statute preclude any other
placement unless "good cause" for avoiding the preference scheme
can be found?108
Again, are these concerns the restricted province of the rele-
vant court, or are they matters which the Commissioner or report-ing body may, should, or must consider? Clearly, the Minnesota
legislature envisaged that the social work infrastructure would
have a role to play in at least some aspects of this process. Thus,
the Commissioner of Human Services is required to "develop crite-
ria for determining whether a prospective adoptive or foster fam-
ily is 'knowledgeable and appreciative' "109 in the context just out-
lined, as well as to develop assessment tools to be used by agencies
"in combination with group interviews and other preplacement ac-
tivities to evaluate prospective adoptive and foster families of mi-
nority children.""10 These tools must assess problem-solving
skills, identify parenting skills, and, when required, evaluate the
105 See MNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993).
106 See CAL. FAm. CODE § 8708(b) (Deering 1993).
107 See MiN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(2) (West 1993).
108 See CAL. Fiu .CODE § 8709 (Deering 1994). One way of looking at the ques-
tion suggests, for example, that the child's physical or emotional needs may require
that a placement which is not listed occur. Another approach suggests that even in
the absence of a preferred placement the child's best interests require an immediate
placement.
109 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(4)(2) (West 1993).
110 Id. § 257.072(4)(5) (emphasis added).
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degree to which the prospective family is knowledgeable and ap-
preciative of racial and ethnic differences."'1
Apart from technical questions such as who would be required
to apply the criteria just described, or what sanctions would be
levied for failure to follow the criteria or use the assessment
tools,"1 2 the statute fails to address the relationship of these con-
cerns to other considerations going to the best interests of the
child. Apparently, this is to be left to the discretion of the Com-
missioner or body preparing the report. To illustrate how prob-
lematic this approach may become, one provision, in force until
July 1, 1993," : which was apparently at least related to the selec-
tion of foster families but which might also have applied to adop-
tive families, required an authorized child placement agency, in
implementing the order of preference, to develop written stan-
dards for determining the suitability of proposed placements. The
statute provides that "[t]he standards need not meet all require-
ments for foster care licensing, but must ensure that the safety,
health and welfare of the child is safeguarded."' 1 4 This provision
suggests that standards, presumably adopted to advance the best
interests of the child, may be lowered in order to qualify a family
within the order of preference-the child's best interests may be
subordinated to the those factors encompassed by the race-based
preference scheme. In addition, the provision suggests that the
objective criteria associated with licensure be replaced by the sub-
Ill Id. The fact that the provision is targeted exclusively to minority children sug-
gests that the law is constitutionally suspect. See In re D. L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379
(Minn. 1992).
112 See supra text accompanying note 111.
113 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(7)(1)(b) (West 1993), repealed by Act of May 17,
1993, ch. 291, § 8, 1993 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1078, 1080 (West). The repealing provi-
sion requires that "the commissioner of human services shall adopt rules to establish
standards for relative foster care placement, conducting relative searches, and
recruiting foster and adoptive families of the same racial or ethnic heritage as the
child." Act of May 17, 1993, ch. 291, § 9, 1993 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1078, 1080
(West). One might question which standards now apply to adoptive placements made
subject to the requirements of the preference scheme.
114 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(7)(1)(b) (West 1993). The wording of the pro-
vision is so obscure that it is not immediately clear whether the standards should only
apply to foster placements, or whether they apply whenever the agency implements
the statutory order of preference. Even if the provision is intended to be restricted to
the former situation, it presumably would impact directly on adoptions which arise in
the context of so-called "fost-adopt" placements, in which it is envisaged that the fos-
ter family might go on to adopt the child. The statutory provision would also apply,
albeit indirectly, when an adoption is sought by foster parents who were previously
qualified as such under standards developed by the agency.
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jective criteria of the agency as it seeks to achieve its race-related
objectives. In such a context, the processes by which the Commis-
sioner or these bodies reach theirconclusions become important.
The Child Welfare League takes the position that the decision
to sanction a proposed adoption "should be the responsibility of
the professional social work staff; it should be made by more than
one person (usually the social worker and the supervisor), and
should take into consideration any findings of consultants from
other professional fields."1 5 Given the League's premiere role in
establishing standards for the provision of social work services to
children, it is not too surprising to find that adoption agencies do
follow a group decision-making procedure, 1-6 in which decisions
may be reached by consensus rather than by formal majority.1 1 7
In this context, an individual social worker's values, beliefs, per-
ceptions, or emotions have a strong potential to play a significant
role. Thus, in its comment to the standard requiring group deci-
sion-making,118 the Child Welfare League notes that "[i]t should
be recognized that social workers' feelings may influence the deci-
sion .. ."'9 Apparently the League's view is that by making a
group decision, individual concerns can be overridden. This, how-
ever, is only the first layer of concern. The League ignores the fact
that the members of the group will very often be people who have
a continuing work relationship with one another. This raises the
specter of decision-making premised on the long-term needs of
that relationship rather than those of the individual child.1 20 The
particular difficulty in the present context is that the decision in-
volves considerations of race. The race-focused concerns being
raised in connection with the child or the adoption petitioners are
all too readily imputable to the decision makers. It is probably for
reasons like these that the National Association of Black Social
Workers' position on trans-racial adoption was able to have such a
115 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION § 5.21 (rev.
ed. 1988).
116 See, e.g., A STUDY OF TRANS RACIAL ADOPTION IN CONNEcTicuT, supra note 71,
at 71.
117 See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs.,
547 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1977). The Drummond court stated, "[A] group consensus
is probably the best way to decide what to do. This certainly is too risky a situation
for any one person to make the decision alone." Id.
118 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
119 See Drummond, 547 F.2d at 837-39; A STUDY OF TRANSRACiAL ADOPTION IN
CONNECTICUT, supra note 71, at 71.
120 See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 297.
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radical impact on the extent to which such placements were
made.121
The only way this problematic group dynamic can be elimi-
nated is to have all the decision makers be of the same race. This
technique, however, leaves open the prospect of a warped consid-
eration of racial issues in the substantive decision. After all, this
has been one of the historical objections of minority groups to the
social work establishment. 122 The problem might be overcome if
appropriate statutory or regulatory standards could be drafted,
but there is evidence that anything going beyond policy and prac-
tice guidelines, and in particular anything requiring adherence to
a strict decision-making formula, would be resisted by social work-
ers. 1 23 Nevertheless, there are those who believe that the social
work infrastructure does require this control.1 2
4
Another aspect of the process is disquieting. Given that the
process is rooted in a tradition of discretionary decision-making by
experts, to what extent is it desirable to subject this process to
review? After all, it has been observed that the delegated deci-
sion-making process, involving the imprecise best interests of the
child standard, avoids hard normative victories and resulting
political dissonance. 25 The question is whether this benefit is suf-
ficient when the issue involves the race-related values of society
and the application of or failure to apply those values to children.
This is not just an intellectual challenge. Minnesota's Commis-
121 See supra text accompanying note 36. Macaulay and Macaulay maintain that
opponents of trans-racial adoption had a great advantage because decision-making
power had been so completely delegated to professionals. Indeed, they suggest that
had legislative prohibitions against such adoptions been sought, many legislators
would have been unwilling to listen. See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 303.
122 See, e.g., Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 278-79.
123 See A STUDY OF TRANsRACIAL ADOPTION IN CoNNEcTIcuT, supra note 71, at 71.
124 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 305; Howard, supra note 4, at 528-
30; Perry supra note 4, at 83 n.121. A comment to the latest discussion draft of the
proposed new Uniform Adoption Act relating to the need for inclusion of specific re-
quirements covering the eligibility of stepparents for consideration as adopters states,
[The provision is necessary] in order to clarify that one of the intentions of
the [Act] is to limit the discretion of agencies and to require that agencies
pay careful attention not only to their own sense of what is appropriate for a
minor, but to the whole of society's sense of what is best for children.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 2-104 commentary (Proposed Discussion Draft Feb. 12, 1993).
125 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 302; cf Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 860 (5th Cir. 1977) (Roney, J.,
dissenting) ("The case-worker system of social service established by the state for the
processing of these very difficult personal and social decisions should not be destroyed
under a constitutional edict.").
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sioner of Human Services has asserted that the state's statutes
effectively endow the Commissioner with a nonreviewable right to
veto any proposed adoption that does not comport with the state's
race-based preference scheme.126 Although the Minnesota Court
of Appeals acknowledged the state judiciary's traditional defer-
ence to an agency's expertise and special knowledge in the field of
its technical training, education, and experience, 127 the court was
of the view that the statutes did permit judicial review and that
appropriate deference could be accorded during this review pro-
cess.128  Similarly, California courts have held that even if the
statute uses words like "review" and "appeal," the court is free to
exercise an independent judgment and is not limited to an analy-
sis of the state agency's exercise of its discretion. 129 Of course, in
considering the desirability of a review process, it should be
remembered that the consequence of litigation is almost inevita-
bly a delay during which "the minor will remain in limbo while
assorted would-be adopters litigate their 'right' to adopt."3 0 The
tripartite character of the process, involving as it does, the place-
ment agency, the child, the aspiring parents, and in some in-
stances, the birth parents, almost invites the prospect of losing the
child's interests.' 3 '
126 In re S.T., 497 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). On the relative author-
ity of the court and the state and private agencies in California, see In re McDonald,
274 P.2d 860 (Cal. 1954).
127 In re S.T., 497 N.W.2d at 628 (holding Commissioner's consent is not required
for court to allow adoption).
128 Id. at 629; see In re Moorhead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). One
view of a "strict scrutiny" based constitutional law standard is that the process re-
quires a trial court to make its own determination without deference to the relevant
social work agency. Id.
129 In re D.S., 236 P.2d 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that court could overrule
decision of state agency against adoption of abandoned child even without showing
that state agency had abused its discretion); see James v. Holy Fam. Adoption Servs.,
274 P.2d 860, 866 (Cal. 1954) (extending independent review to adoption of volunta-
rily relinquished and abandoned children).
130 UNIF. ADOPTION AcT, supra note 124, § 2-104 commentary (Proposed Discus-
sion Draft Feb. 12, 1993); see Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1224 (noting that studies
indicate that children benefit from permanent placement as opposed to foster care).
131 Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1224. It might be simpler to attempt to protect the
child's interests within the agency's discretionary decisionmaking structure. From a
purely technical point of view, however, legal authority over the child will frequently
be vested in the agency itself. If there were a complete unity of interest between the
agency and the child, it might be appropriate for the agency's legal staff to represent
the interests of the child. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE, supra note 115, § 6.28. But
agencies have their own institutional agendas, which may lead their interests to di-
verge from those of any particular child. Thus, for example, in Minnesota, the Coin-
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Even if it is considered appropriate to review an agency's deci-
sion, triggering that review is not necessarily an easy task. Nor is
it assured that a review will involve an appropriate analysis. As
to the former proposition, it does not seem desirable to have to
mount a constitutional challenge to the statute to see that consid-
erations relating to the child's best interests are applied appropri-
ately. Additionally, as discussed at some length below, standing
to challenge the constitutionality of such a provision may be a
commodity in short supply.132 When race-based factors play a role
in the placement decision, however, it appears desirable to probe
the discretionary decision-making process. As we have seen, the
Minnesota statutory scheme does little to lay any formal founda-
tion for such a process; to make matters worse, as just noted, the
Commissioner of Human Services has asserted a nonreviewable
veto power.133 In contrast, the current Discussion Draft of the
new Uniform Adoption Act takes a different approach. Having
specifically rejected the appropriateness of considerations of race,
ethnicity, or religious affiliation in any placement decision by an
agency,134 the draft provides that an agency's decision to place a
minor with an individual is presumed to be in the best interests of
the minor.135 When placement, however, is with someone other
than a relative, stepparent, or foster parent as defined in the
Act,136 this presumption may be rebutted by a relative, steppar-
ent, or foster parent proving "in an appropriate action by a pre-
ponderance of evidence"'37 that the child has substantial emo-
tional ties to the adopting individual and that an adoptive
placement with that individual would not be contrary to the best
interests of the minor.1 38
missioner of Human Services is required to report to the Indian Affairs Council, the
Council on the Affairs of Spanish-speaking People, the Council on Black Minnesotans
and the Council on Asian-Pacific Minnesotans with respect to minority placements.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(5) (West 1993).
132 See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 126.
134 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 2-104(a)(1) commentary (Proposed Discussion Draft
Feb. 12, 1993).
135 Id. § 2-104(c).
136 Only those relatives, stepparents, or foster parents who have cared for the
minor for 12 months or more within the preceding 24 months, or a relative who makes
a written request to adopt the child, are covered by the provision. UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT, § 2-104(1)(a)(iii), (iv) commentary (Proposed Discussion Draft Feb. 12, 1993).
Moreover, only specific relatives are covered. Id. § 1-101(14).




One final consideration is relevant here. Even if it is possible
to get a court to review an agency's decision, it is not clear that
courts would be willing to participate in the process. Certainly, an
early appraisal by commentators on trans-racial adoption was
that the judiciary quickly became adept at employing technicali-
ties to avoid the mine field of normative values that cases of this
type embody.13 9 In this regard, at least in Minnesota, it would
seem that matters are delicately poised.' 4 ° However, as has been
noted, abdicating responsibility for decision-making to "experts" is
a social ritual designed to minimize the price of conflict. But the
low price of reduced conflict may exact a high cost in the actual
consequences of those decisions.1
41
IV. CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW QUESTIONS AND RELATED IssUEs
A. Introduction
The constitutional law questions raised by the injection of
race into the arena of adoption are potentially many and varied.
To begin with, there are the various participants: the adoption
petitioners, possibly able to assert "rights" based on a role as a
foster parent or "relative"; the state, often as current guardian or
legal custodian of the child, or at a minimum as licensor of a child
placement or adoption agency; a natural parent, whose parental
rights may or may not have been terminated; and finally, the
child. There is also the legal "device" at issue-a statutory or
common law rule or regulation: (1) purporting to be dispositive of
the outcome; (2) establishing a presumption or preference; (3) ar-
ticulating a "factor" for consideration by the decision maker; or (4)
requiring that the decision maker be supplied with race-related
information, which may or may not impact on the decision. The
purpose behind the rule or regulation cannot be ignored. In the
jargon of constitutional law analysis, it may be "invidiously dis-
criminatory," "remedial," or "benign." Further, regardless of the
purpose, essentially the same characterizations may be attributed
139 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 305-06; see also Bazemore v. Davis,
394 A.2d 1377, 1383 (D.C. 1978) (en banc). "A norm is ill-suited for determining the
future of a unique being whose adjustment is vital to the welfare of future genera-
tions." Id.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 83-87, 126, 133; see also Glynn, supra note
5, at 926 n.5 (discussing Minnesota's battle over trans-racial adoption statutes).
141 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 10, at 306 (citing Kenneth E. Boulding,
Truth or Power, 190 SCIENCE 423 (1975)).
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to the application of the rule or regulation. Finally, there is the
posture of the case. Is it, for example, a competitive situation,
when petitioners of different races are pitted against each other
for authority to adopt the child? Are a single family's efforts to
adopt being adversely impacted by a divergence between its own
race and that of the child? Is it a situation in which a child is
being indefinitely institutionalized or otherwise impermanently
placed because no adoptive parents of the same race are available,
and a trans-racial placement is constrained by the law in some
way? All of this is without consideration of whether the law's
characterization of "race" in these contexts is sufficient to pass
constitutional muster.
Some of these topics are beyond the scope of this Article. Gen-
erally, limited statutory provisions requiring an administrative
agency and the courts to abide by a specified race-based prefer-
ence scheme, in the best interests of the child, when sanctioning
an adoption, are considered. Even a relatively brief consideration,
however, of the legislation in light of the questions just raised
manifests the specter of a project having the worst attributes of a
hydra and a bramble bush. A single logically coherent place to
begin the analysis probably does not exist. Nevertheless, an ex-
amination of some of the parties involved partially helps to elimi-
nate some extraneous concerns, but more importantly, it leads to
a more or less common starting point from which to feed the pro-
cess into well-established, although contentious, analytic
frameworks.
B. Parties Involved
1. Generic Adoptive Parent
In the abstract, an aspiring parent is not generally regarded
as having a "right" to adopt, and so a constitutional law analysis is
not founded on "liberties."142 In the absence of the ability to af-
142 See Tibbetts v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that "penumbras" composing constitutional right of privacy do not encom-
pass right to adopt). It is problematic to talk about "liberty interests" or "fundamental
rights" in the technical sense, because the constitutional rights that surround the
family have their origins in a variety of sources. Indeed, in any given case the "lib-
erty" at stake may be seen by different justices as predicated on different theories. For
example, the majority in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), ruled that the "lib-
erty" to marry was available because the statute in question failed an equal protec-
tion analysis, but Justice Stewart found a foundation for it in the Due Process Clause.
The current view that a "liberty" to adopt does not exist is subject to change, espe-
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firmatively assert a "right" that is allegedly being infringed by ra-
cial considerations, the would-be adoptive parent whose efforts to
adopt are being thwarted by these considerations has little choice
but to attempt to eliminate, or restrict the role of, these considera-
tions in the adoption process. In short, the mere existence of the
race-based preference scheme puts the would-be adopter into a
negative litigation posture. It is not the merits of the applicant
but the demerits of the statutory system that are in issue. In this
regard, the constitutional law weapon of choice is an "equal pro-
tection" analysis.
Before commencing an equal protection analysis, indeed al-
most any constitutional law analysis, the question of standing
must be addressed. As even the briefest excursus into Tribe
reveals, the question of standing is one of considerable subtlety.14
Moreover, in the adoption context, the problem may be made man-
ifest by inaction rather than action. Thus, to ground the issue fac-
tually, would an aspiring parent in Minnesota have standing to
challenge a statute if that potential adopter is never offered an
adoptive placement by an authorized child placement agency, and
the would-be adopter believes that that failure is attributable to
the agency following the requirements of the race-based prefer-
ence statute requirements?14 4  Can the complainant show per-
sonal injury traceable to the unlawful conduct and likely to be re-
dressed by the requested relief? 45
2. Natural Parent
Under normal circumstances, one might anticipate that a nat-
ural parent would have little control over race-related issues asso-
cially in light of legal developments in the areas of artificial conception and surrogate
parenting. These recent developments may provide an appropriate framework for
recognition of parenthood by adoption as a constitutional right. Thereafter, race-
based, adoption-related decision-making could pit the compelling interests of an as-
pirant adoptive parent against whatever role was asserted for race in advancing the
best interests of the child. And, there is at least some Supreme Court doctrine to the
effect that in the family arena constitutionally grounded rights may not be affected in
an inappropriate way by considerations of race, either overtly, see Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), or covertly as a result of a discriminatory impact, see Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
143 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CoNsTTUrTrIoNAL LAW § 3-14 (2d ed. 1988).
144 See generally Carlson v. City of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453, 456 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that white couple seeking to adopt black child lacked standing
because they had not met statutory filing requirements), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023
(1989).
145 See TRnr., supra note 143, § 3-15.
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ciated with the adoption of his or her child. Generally, the parent
will have surrendered parental rights voluntarily, or those rights
will have been terminated involuntarily. Given the severance of
the link with the natural parent, it might seem inappropriate to
permit this individual to impose his or her views on race upon the
choice of a suitable adoptive parent. This assumption appears to
be contrary to the perspective of the statutory framework. Statu-
tory schemes frequently give the natural parents some input into
questions of both the race and religion of adoptive parents.
Whether such provisions exist for the psychological benefit of the
natural parent or for the practical benefit of the adoption process,
in that they induce a greater measure of cooperation on the part of
the natural parent, or whether such provisions reflect certain met-
aphysical social values, is not usually apparent. In any event,
Minnesota has provisions of this type. They require both child
placement agencies and courts to honor any request by a genetic
parent that the race-based preference scheme not be followed in-
asmuch as the scheme gives priority to a placement with a rela-
tive146 or person of the same race or ethnic heritage as the
child. 147 These requests are to be honored only in a manner con-
sistent with the best interests of the child. 4 ' Perhaps in this way
the scheme noticeably does not enable the genetic parent to pre-
clude consideration of when an adoptive family of a different racial
or ethnic heritage is "knowledgeable and appreciative" of the
child's racial or ethnic heritage. Similarly, in California there
may be "good cause" not to follow the race-based preference
scheme if a parent requests that it not be followed.149 Not surpris-
ingly, in Arkansas the statute contains no express provision per-
mitting a parent to request a trans-racial placement. 150
Since the Minnesota statute gives the genetic parent the op-
portunity to request a trans-racial placement which the state or
court can nevertheless dishonor in certain circumstances, the stat-
ute does seem to provide a genetic parent with the necessary foun-
dation from which to mount a constitutional law challenge to the
146 One of the reasons for this provision may be to enable the parent to avoid
information regarding pregnancy coming to the attention of family members.
147 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.28(2), 259.255 (West 1993).
148 Id. § 259.28(2) ("[Tlhe court shall honor that request consistent with the best
interests of the child.").
149 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (Deering 1993). The new provision restricts this au-
thority to statutorily defined "birth" parents. Id. § 8709(a).
150 See ARx. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993).
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statute itself. More important, by giving the parent the opportu-
nity to request an alteration in the preference structure, the stat-
ute opens up the issue of the inherent integrity of this structure.
After all, the statutory premise for the structure is a legislative
determination that it is in the best interests of the child that "due
consideration be given to the child's racial or ethnic heritage."1 51
This is followed by the preference scheme. If the issue of the race
of the adoptive parents is so important, why should legislative de-
terminations in that regard even potentially be reversible at the
whim of the genetic parent?152 Conversely, if the issue is not that
important, is the race of the adoptive parent in fact being used as
a proxy for some other characteristic? For instance, the legisla-
ture has declined to allow the genetic parent the ability to over-
ride the requirement that the adoptive parent be "knowledgeable
and appreciative" of the child's racial and ethnic heritage. Is the
adoptive parent's "race" a short cut to identifying a person who is
"knowledgeable and appreciative"? Is this process not an example
of stereotyping? Furthermore, if this is the legislature's logic, is it
not stigmatizing to make the implicit converse assumption that a
person of a different race will not have the requisite appreciation
or knowledge?
3. Relative
The statutes of Arkansas, California, and Minnesota all dis-
play a preference for the child to be adopted by relatives. Rela-
tives, as a class, indeed seem favored as potential adoptive par-
ents.153 Thus, when the original version of Minnesota's preference
statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, the court inferred a legislative preference for adoption by
relatives based on a legislative intent to reinforce the biological
family and a historical common-law preference for vesting custody
151 MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.28(2), 259.255 (West 1993).
152 See Aiu. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993). Ironically, the Arkansas statute,
which does not specifically give the genetic parent this authority, is more immune to
constitutional challenge, even though the motive behind not providing for a genetic
parent to request a trans-racial placement may be suspect. See generally id.
153 The Draft Uniform Adoption Act gives a preference to relatives, distinguish-
ing between relatives who have cared for the minor for 12 months or more in the last
24 months and those who have not. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-104 (Proposed Discussion
Draft Feb. 12, 1993) and commentary. The latter are ranked behind a stepparent or
foster parent who has cared for the child during this 12 month period. Id. The com-
ment to the draft states that adoption agencies should be bound by society's general
sense of what the most appropriate order of preference should be. Id.
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in relatives as persons, who through kinship, would be disposed to
do more for the welfare of the child. 1 5  Another jurisdiction sees
relatives as "better equipped as living examples thereof to inject
into the life of the adoptee the real sense of her ... heritage and
culture."1 5  Thus, in the context of Minnesota's preference
scheme, according the highest priority to a relative would seem
unobjectionable were it not for the legislation's prior history.
As originally enacted, Minnesota's legislation was targeted
only at preserving the racial or ethnic heritage of minorities. 156
After the provisions were found to be unconstitutional, the sec-
tions containing the preference structure were amended to delete
references to minorities.1 57 The sections were otherwise left in-
tact. This history suggests that one rationale for according a pref-
erence to relatives in the original version of the statute was to use
the classification of "relative" as a proxy for achieving race-related
objectives. Indeed, the Arkansas statute, which is otherwise iden-
tical to that of Minnesota, is still facially restricted in its applica-
tion to minority children.5 ' Notwithstanding the elimination of
the reference to minorities from the amended Minnesota sections,
it is arguable that the original historical overlay of race-related
concerns remains. Accordingly, a nonrelative aspiring parent
whose claim is rejected by an agency or the court in favor of the
claim of a relative of a different race might have the foundation for
a constitutional challenge to the statutes. It should be noted in
this regard that whatever the virtues of relatives in connection
with the adoption of a child, these virtues are all capable of being
enumerated in appropriate legislation. Further, assuming that
the objective of any legislation is to advance the best interests of
the child, the use of the term "relative" is at best an approxima-
154 In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 412-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), afld on other
grounds, 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992). The court held
that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in
that its original version applied only to minority children. Id. at 413. The court found
that this was an unnecessary racial classification since the heritage of a minority
child could be protected by simply creating a preference for all placements to be made
with relatives. Id. at 413. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court further reasoned
that "kin will be disposed to do more for [the] welfare [of the child] and to advance its
interests than those who lack the prompting of kinship .... " In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d
at 380 (citing State ex rel. Waldron v. Bienek, 193 N.W. 452, 452-53 (Minn. 1923)).
155 In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. 1985).
156 MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.28(2), 259.255 (West 1990).
157 1992 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 577, §§ 4, 5 (West).
158 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102(b) (Michie 1993) (applying to children "of minority
racial or minority ethnic heritage").
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tion. Undoubtedly, there are relatives with the necessary virtues
and those without them. Moreover, since the process of adoption
placement and confirmation by the court necessarily requires a
case-by-case screening of potential adoptive parents, any argu-
ment that the use of "relative" is appropriate as a shorthand de-
vice in the interests of efficiency seems spurious.1 59 These argu-
ments are even more compelling in relation to the Arkansas
statute which, as noted, is restricted in its application to minority
children. In the context of a constitutional challenge, these con-
siderations bear heavily on the adequacy of the tailoring of this
legislation to its declared goals.
Although the use of the term "relative" is typically sought to
be used in the best interests of the child, the Minnesota statutory
scheme accords the highest priority to a relative unless one is un-
available or such a placement would be "detrimental" to the child.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the scheme's
structure as precluding the need for a best interests of the child
analysis. 160 Parenthetically, this interpretation came at a time
when the statutory provision applied exclusively to minority chil-
dren.161 Thus, if the concept of "relative" is there for its embodi-
ment of "race" and for whatever other virtues relatives are pre-
sumed by the legislature to possess, the child's best interests were
expressly subordinated to race-based concerns. The apparent in-
sensitivity of this approach might be softened somewhat were the
courts willing to take a broad view of when a proposed adoption by
a relative would be detrimental to the child. In the Minnesota
Supreme Court's view, however, there must be "a demonstrated
actual injurious impact of the relationship on the physical or emo-
tional well-being of the child or a showing to a reasonable degree
of certainty that the facts and circumstances of the proposed
placement pose the substantial likelihood that actual harm will
occur."162 By contrast, the California statute specifically provides
159 Who is a better candidate for adoptive parent, great uncle George, finally
tracked down after an eight-year search, or the foster parents with whom the child
has lived, since birth, during the search process?
160 See In re M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990) (en banc). Technically, this
interpretation occurred in the context of a case transferring legal custody and guardi-
anship, not an adoption case. Id. However, the preference provision at issue,
§ 260.181(3), was identical to the statutory preference scheme regulating adoptions
effective at that time.
161 Id.
162 Id.; see In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992).
Foster parents appealed from an order granting adoption to the child's grandparents.
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that the scheme need not be followed "if placement with available
relatives is not in the child's 'best interest.' "163
Furthermore, although the statutory scheme is described as a
preference scheme, it has been applied as one creating a presump-
tion. Thus, a person seeking to avoid the statutory order of prefer-
ence is required by Minnesota Supreme Court interpretation to
make an affirmative showing that placement with a relative
would be detrimental to the child.1 64 Presumably, if the challenge
were to a placement with a family of the same racial or ethnic
heritage as the child, the burden would be on the challenger to
establish that that placement was not "feasible"' 61-which proba-
bly amounts to no basis for a challenge at all.' 66
Finally, to be sure, the statutory preference scheme need not
be followed in the presence of "good cause to the contrary."167 Pre-
sumably, this would give the courts at least one bite at a "best
interests" analysis in the context of the preference scheme, 68 as
well as an opportunity to override the racial basis of the scheme's
structure. It is doubtful, however, absent a successful constitu-
tional attack on the provision itself, that the court would be able
to do anything more than conclude that, in the particular circum-
stances of the case, a proposed disposition generated by racial con-
cerns would be inappropriate. 6 9 Presumably, the need to over-
Id. at 376. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that although separation from the
foster parents would initially be painful for the child, it was not sufficient cause to
overcome the family preference. Id. at 381.
163 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(b) (Deering 1993).
164 In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 377 (holding that absent showing of good cause or
detriment to child, placement with relatives is presumptively in child's best
interests).
165 See MiN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.28(2), 259.255 (West 1993).
166 See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny anal-
ysis of presumption).
167 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.28(2), 259.255 (West 1993).
168 Minnesota's adoption statute provides that the court is to grant an adoption
petition only upon finding that it is in the best interests of the child. Id. § 259.28(1)(a).
However, this requirement presumably applies only with respect to an adoption by
any petitioner remaining after the court has eliminated other contenders using the
preference scheme. As such, this subdivision does not provide the opportunity for the
court to decide which claimant is in the child's best interests, except possibly if two or
more claimants with the same degree of priority remain after the application of the
scheme. The Minnesota scheme can be contrasted with the California scheme, which
contains a statutory description of "good cause" for not following the race-based
scheme. "Good cause" includes the fact that a placement following the scheme would
not be in the best interests of the child. CAL. FAm. CODE § 8709(d) (Deering 1993).
169 See, e.g., In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd on other
grounds, 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992). The Minnesota
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ride the preference structure on the basis of "good cause" will be
an affirmative obligation left at the door of the challenger.1 7 0
It is worth remarking that society has endowed the ties of re-
lationship with a strong metaphysical value. The challenge in the
context of placing a child for adoption is to extricate from those
ties those attributes which actually inure to the best interests of a
given child, and to refrain from using those ties to inject spurious
considerations into the dispositional analysis, thereby corrupting
the metaphysical value itself.
4. Foster Parents
For practical reasons, foster parents are the group most likely
to be aware of being disadvantaged by a statutory preference
scheme such as that of Minnesota's. In Minnesota, when a child is
placed for adoption by a licensed child placement agency, the
agency is required to abide by the preference scheme. 17 ' A similar
rule applies in California.' 7 2 This would suggest that if the place-
ment were occurring in an orderly way, no person in a group en-
joying a lower priority in the preference scheme would even be
aware of the availability of a child until the prospect of adoption
by a person in a higher ranked group was exhausted.
Foster parents are one group to whom this premise would not
apply. Although the legislation requires that the race-based order
Court of Appeals recognized that the language of the Minnesota adoption statute was
constitutionally valid. Id. at 413. Although the court ruled that a child's best interests
would be served by a preference for placement with relatives, it did not rely on racial
reasons. Id. In affirming, the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished an earlier deci-
sion in which it had allowed the rejection of a grandmother's adoption petition in
favor of one by the foster parents. In Re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 381. The court noted
that in the earlier case, the grandmother was over 60 years old, was a single parent,
and had experienced difficulty in raising her own children. Id. These facts amounted
to "good cause" sufficient to override the statute's preference for relatives. Id.
170 In Re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 381. In In re D.L., the Minnesota Supreme Court
accepted the trial court's approach for adjudging competing adoption petitions from
the child's grandparents and foster parents. Id. Given the existence of the statutory
preference, the trial court proceeded to hear the grandparents' petition first, and then
permitted the foster parents to intervene, but only for the purpose of presenting evi-
dence on the question of whether there was "good cause" for not following the prefer-
ence scheme. Id. at 377-78.
171 See MniN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West 1993). In Arkansas, the Department of
Human Services, in making foster care placements, is required to give "due considera-
tion... to the child's minority race or minority ethnic heritage." Aiuc CODE ANN. § 9-
9-102(a) (Michie 1993).
172 CAL. F~i. CODE § 7950 (Deering 1993).
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of preference be applied in making foster care placements, 173 the
reality is that the pressure to make a foster care placement will
generally be much more immediate than the pressure to make an
appropriate adoption placement. In these circumstances, unless
there are readily available "relatives" or suitable foster homes of
the same race, there is a reasonable prospect that the child will be
placed in a home with a different racial background.Y7 4  Even
though the foster family is likely to be aware that the child is
available for adoption, psychological and sociological bonds be-
tween the foster parents and the child may start to form even
while the search for "preferred" adoptive parents is underway.
Not surprisingly then, the bulk of the high profile litigation
occurs in the form of challenges to the preference scheme in the
contexts of battles for the right to adopt between foster parents
and claimants higher on the preference ladder. In this regard, fos-
ter parents have no priority in the state's preference scheme.
Moreover, in the larger scheme of things, courts generally have
been reluctant to endow the class of foster parents with any par-
ticular status in constitutional law.175 Even when such constitu-
tional acknowledgement is accorded them, it tends to be in the
realm of procedural rights rather than as substantive entitle-
ments to be considered as potential adoptive parents.' 7
6
173 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.072(7)(1), 260.181(3) (West 1993).
174 See Perry, supra note 4, at 125 (suggesting that white foster families be pre-
screened regarding ability to care for minority children on potentially long-term
basis).
175 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) ("Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster
family, as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the
proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural par-
ents."); see also J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 n.5 (8th Cir. 1989) (determining
that placement did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of foster
parents), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206-08 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (re-
jecting arguments that adoptive parents have protected interests under Fourteenth
Amendment), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp.
25, 27 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that foster parents do not have cognizable liberty in-
terest); Perry, supra note 4, at 106-09. But see Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F.
Supp. 653, 662, 664 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (observing that "psychological ties" could lead to
"state created liberty interest" under certain circumstances); In re Jamie G., 241 Cal.
Rptr. 869, 873-74 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding mother with neither blood relation nor legal
ties had no due process right), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988).
176 See Mason & Williams, supra note 9, at 108. It has been suggested that the
greater the extent to which states, through their agencies or legislation, create inter-
ests for foster parents which the courts are willing to acknowledge in the context of
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This ambivalence toward foster parents is understandable. A
legally protected relationship opens the Pandora's box of an irre-
trievable child once the child is placed in foster care. Although the
sympathies may not be all one way with respect to a child so
placed after neglect or abandonment, the situation is otherwise
when the child is the subject of a voluntary surrender by a parent
aware of the need for help. Yet, the ambivalence is an unsophisti-
cated one. Rules spawned in anticipation that the child will be
returned to a pre-existing family group need not necessarily apply
in contexts in which that outcome is no longer contemplated. Of
course, this does not imply that the foster parents' claims need to
be elevated to those of constitutional dimension. It does mean,
however, that when the claims of such foster parents are weighed
against those asserting a preference by virtue of race or heritage,
the foster parents should not be handicapped by the system's
spurious concerns regarding the potential impact of those claims
on the system's collateral operations.
Thus, when it comes to the adoption process in general, and
the application of a statutory preference like those under consider-
ation in particular, a good case can be made for legally giving fos-
ter parents more than a passing nod.' 7 7 Unlike the other aspiring
parents in the preference hierarchy, foster parents already have a
working relationship with the child, which is a successful relation-
ship from the child's point of view because otherwise an alterna-
tive placement would have been found. Granted, a placement
which works in the short-term may not be one which is appropri-
ate in the long run. Nevertheless, it seems perverse, on the basis
of a presumption 178 formulated in the abstract, to terminate a via-
ble relationship in favor of those marginal benefits that another
relationship might offer by virtue of race or formal social relation-
due process claims, the more likely it is that a basis will be found for an equal protec-
tion claim when these relationships are interfered with on the basis of race. Id.
177 See UNIF. ADoPTION AcT § 2-104 (a)(1)(iii) (Proposed Discussion Draft Feb. 12,
1993) (affording preference to foster parents who have cared for child for 12 months or
more during preceding 24 months).
178 See Glynn, supra note 5, at 943 (arguing that Minnesota statute does not cre-
ate presumption that petitioner must overcome, but merely functions as "plus," way
to "tip the scales," or "mere factor"). From the perspective of an analysis which focuses
on the best interests of the child, Glynn's argument is persuasive. In fact, there is no
conclusive presumption that a placement on the basis of race is in the child's best
interests, although the Minnesota statute comes close to such a presumption. How-
ever, from the perspective of an aspiring parent of a different race who is otherwise as
qualified as a same-race adoptive parent, the statute does function as a presumption.
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ship. Can the legislature and, in due course, the courts be com-
fortable enough with the correlation between anticipated benefits
and legal classification to justify the almost axiomatic social
upheaval?179
Encountered here is one of the classic examples of the legal
system's discomfort at having to address function-based relation-
ships rather than status-based relationships. This situation is
manifested whenever the law is required to determine a disposi-
tion using the best interests standard. In the interests of cer-
tainty and efficiency, the pressure on the legal system, and for
that matter, the administrative system, seems to continue relent-
lessly in the direction of status.18 0 Why not have adoption by race
or relationship? It seems, and is, a lot simpler than the detailed
balancing of a multitude of nonquantifiable variables inherent in
a "best interests" analysis. This may be another reason for the
intensity of litigation and debate that racial preference adoption
statutes provoke. Such schemes may be viewed as simply being
employed for the benefit of the legal process itself rather than to
advance the interests of the child in the manner the system is
claimed to do. This helps to explain why such schemes are so diffi-
cult to manage within the umbrella of a "best interests" analysis.
It also helps to explain why these preference schemes may be
prone to unconstitutionality, if the courts ever reach the issue of
179 See Perry, supra note 4, at 100-05. The author argues that existing emotional
bonds should not be disrupted to effect an intra-race placement. Id. at 102. She points
out that the unstated assumption in most of the cases is that the long-term effects of
racial considerations are more important than the imminent potential damage of
breaking psychological bonds. Id. Perry adds that when many of the leading cases
were decided, the decisions were premised upon the courts' speculation about the fu-
ture rather than on social science research, and that the research conducted since
that time does not support the courts' assumptions. Id. at 104.
180 At this juncture, a minor deviation is justified to note that these situations
reflect examples of the apparent shift from status to contract. Many foster parents are
now required to acknowledge by contract that whatever the incidents of the status of
foster parent might be, a longer term expectation of the right to adopt is not one of
them. See NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., LEGAL IssuEs IN FOSTER CAR 21 (1976). A
representative foster care contract provided:
We acknowledge that we are accepting the child placed with us for an inde-
terminate period... We are aware that the legal responsibility for the foster
child remains with the Agency, and we will accept and comply with any
plans the Agency makes for the child. This includes the right to determine
when and how the child leaves us, and we agree to cooperate with the ar-




constitutionality-the schemes may be seen as not being used to
do what they purport to do.
From the foster parents' point of view, however, the intensity
of their objections has its roots in another source. Unlike an aspir-ing parent in the abstract, whether of an appropriate race or eth-
nic heritage or a would-be relative who has been "found" by social
workers, the foster family wants this child, not just any child. An-
other reason for the intensity is that the cases suggest that not
infrequently the foster parents speak for the voice least often
heard from in the context of these adoption proceedings, the voice
of the child.
5. The Child
Although nominally the focus of attention in the legal analy-
sis of trans-racial adoptions, the child possesses only a tiny voice,
perhaps no voice at all. Part of the problem is practical. A new-
born infant is clearly in no position to articulate adoption prefer-
ences, nor for that matter are many older children. This practical
premise, however, has laid the foundation for a constitutional law
analysis which makes the advancement of a position which is
uniquely the child's difficult indeed.
Some efforts have been made in this direction. Thus, in
Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family & Children's
Services,' 81 counsel for the child sought to establish a liberty in-
terest for the child which was characterized as the "right to a sta-
ble environment," premised in part on the "love, affection, and
concern" that developed between the child and foster parents who
sought to adopt him .1 2 It was argued that this liberty interest
would, in turn, lay the foundation for a claim that the child was
entitled to assert procedural due process rights with respect to the
proposed termination of his pre-existing relationship with his fos-
ter parents. 1 3 The court rejected the idea that the child had such
a liberty interest.'8 4 By contrast, the dissent seemed to be of the
181 563 F.2d 1200, 1206-08 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910
(1978).
182 Id. at 1208, 1210; see also Perry, supra note 4, at 72-76.
183 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1208.
184 Id. at 1209. A panel of the Fifth Circuit previously had appeared to find that
such a right did exist. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's
Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 856 (5th Cir. 1977), on reh'g, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), and
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). The full court was carefully evasive on the issue,
making sure to limit the decision to instant facts, "This decision by its facts is neces-
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view that the child has a protected interest. 1 5 In this regard, it
cited statements made by the United States Supreme Court in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form18 6 to the effect that the relationship between the child and
foster parents could be as close as that which exists in biological
families.18 7 Other courts have also rejected claims brought by the
children. In Child v. Beame,8 s an argument that children had an
equal protection claim on the grounds that by virtue of race they
had been denied access to adoption, and thus, denied a stable per-
manent home, survived a motion in a federal district court to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim for relief, but failed on the mer-
its.189 Nevertheless, with this decision in mind, another federal
district court simply rejected the idea that a child had any consti-
tutional right to a "permanent, stable adoptive home." 90
The dissent in Drummond was particularly upset by a percep-
tion that the state's position was that, since the legislative/admin-
istrative structure was designed to accommodate the child's best
interests, it was acceptable to leave everything relating to the
child's welfare and status to the uncontrolled and unreviewable
discretion of state and county employees.' 91 From a legal point of
view, how would the child's concerns be articulated within any de-
cision-making structure? One view is that this must occur within
the agency infrastructure.1 92 Another source is seen as the child's
natural parents.193 In addition, one judge has preferred to charac-
terize a trans-racial adoption as a consensual matter in which, be-
cause the child is not of consenting age, the court stands in for the
sarily applicable only to an infant of tender years placed in a foster home for the
length of time and under the circumstances here involved." 563 F.2d at 1209.
185 563 F.2d at 1214-15 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
186 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
187 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1214 (Tuttle, J., dissenting); see Brown v. County of
San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 664 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
188 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
189 Id.
190 Joseph and Josephine A. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp.
346, 352 (D.N.M. 1983) ("[T]here is no caselaw even suggesting that these children
are somehow entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to enjoy the benefits of a
foster or adoptive family.").
191 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1215 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
192 See supra note 131 (discussing apparent simplicity of protecting child's best
interests through agency discretion).
193 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 858 (Roney, J., dissenting). "Because an infant is in-
capable of exercising [certain rights] for himself, under Georgia law either the parents
who voluntarily gave up a child for adoption or the agency given legal custody of a
child must exercise that right for him." Id. at 858-59.
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child to decide what is in the child's best interests.19 4 In a differ-
ent twist, a foster parent and aspiring trans-racial adoptive par-
ent sued to block a proposed intra-racial adoption by bringing suit
in the capacity of the child's "next friend." 95 Needless to say, fos-
ter parents suing in their own names undoubtedly see themselves
as representing the child's position. So confused, or perhaps com-
plex, is the situation that one court has allowed the appointment
of both a guardian ad litem and an attorney to represent the
child. 9 6
Broadening the representational mayhem still further, there
are those who claim, either overtly or covertly, that broader social
groups should assert the child's position on the relevancy of race
to the question of adoption placements. To some extent, the statu-
tory preference schemes purport to do just this. This also occurs
when a judge compels a participant to establish why a trans-racial
placement should be allowed.197 The power to decide what is ap-
propriate for a minority child has also been claimed for the minor-
ity communities. '9  This raises the interesting question of the
procedure by which these groups might articulate their concerns.
Would they do so through legislation or the administrative pro-
cess? Arguably, preference scheme legislation is a concrete mani-
festation of an effort to turn the question over to the minority com-
munities. However, given the lack of subtlety of the preference
structure, this process cannot be accepted as one concerning itself
194 See In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 801 (D.C. 1982) (stating that since "[tihe child
is not of consenting age.., the court... is in the difficult position of standing in her
shoes and judging what is in her best interest."); cf Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-
CV-W-6, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 1992).
195 Child, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *2. The court took the view that proce-
durally the better posture for the petitioner was to seek relief as a petitioner for adop-
tion. Id. at n.1.
196 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 857.
197 In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 801 (Newman, J., dissenting).
If the child had capacity to decide for herself, she would certainly not be
prevented from taking note of the different race of those proposing to adopt
her. When the court does the same on her behalf, there is no indication of
invidiousness that necessitates the strictest level of scrutiny.
Id. A potentially problematic aspect of this approach is highlighted by the court's con-
cern to develop a technique for reviewing a trial court's decision with a view to identi-
fying possible racial bias. Id. at 790.
198 Chimezie, supra note 72, at 297-98. Articulation of the community's position
has also been acknowledged as problematic. Id. at 298; see Perry, supra note 4, at 116-
17 (arguing that blacks as group have interest in issue).
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with the interests of any one child in particular, at least as far as
the question of a race-based placement is concerned. 199
Obviously, none of the voices is necessarily a reliable spokes-
person for the child. Moreover, for the purposes of constitutional
law, it is well to heed the comment of Justice Brennan, writing the
opinion of the Court in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,20 0 that even a purportedly "benign" race-based program, to
survive intermediate scrutiny, may not single out "those least well
represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign
program."20 1
C. The Technical Analysis
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court has never conducted an analysis of a
race-based preference scheme applicable to adoptions, nor indeed
has it conducted an analysis of the mere consideration of race in
the context of an adoption placement. Yet, as Tribe points out, the
Supreme Court has tended to regard all "governmental uses of ex-
plicit racial classifications as constitutionally problematic to some
degree .... This conclusion reflects an analysis of cases con-
cerning various manifestations of preference schemes "favoring"
minorities. Although none of these cases involves statutory adop-
tion schemes reflecting racial considerations, in all of the cases the
Justices seem to think that some form of heightened scrutiny is
required.2 °3 If the rights involved could be construed as funda-
mental, any effort to burden those rights with racial considera-
tions generally would trigger "strict scrutiny" by the court.20 4
Adoption is perceived as a creature of statute, and at least from
the adults' perspective, has never been perceived as impinging on
"fundamental" rights.20 5 Accordingly, any heightened level of
scrutiny would have to be that triggered by an equal protection
analysis. Any such analysis, when applied to adoption, becomes
199 But see Perry, supra note 4, at 118. The author argues that the child's inter-
ests are advanced by promoting a "healthy and positive racial identity." Id. It should
be noted that Perry advocates this perspective only in a context in which race is not
used to disrupt an existing "caretaker" relationship. Id.
200 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
201 Id. at 361.
202 See TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1523.
203 See TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1523.
204 See TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1464.
205 See Grossman, supra note 4, at 306.
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intensely difficult. This is a function of difficulties associated with
the equal protection doctrine itself, and of ambiguities, uncertain-
ties and contradictions associated with the role of race in the con-
text of adoptions.
2. The Equal Protection Analysis
For over a decade, it has been virtually impossible to isolate a
single equal protection case, let alone a consistent series of deci-
sions, from which it is possible to extract any more than a plural-
ity perspective. Thus, it seems futile to attempt to predict pre-
cisely how a Supreme Court of a specific composition would
respond to a case introducing race into the adoption arena. Never-
theless, the pluralities have articulated certain themes, and the
intersection of these themes and the concerns of race-conscious
adoption schemes is both enlightening and troubling.
a. Strict Scrutiny
Whether an equal protection analysis in the adoption context
would demand strict scrutiny is unclear. Nevertheless, despite
earlier lower court approaches to the contrary, current Supreme
Court jurisprudence seems to suggest that a strict scrutiny analy-
sis is appropriate.2 °6 Moreover, even if the statutory preference
schemes do attract strict scrutiny, the precise approach that
would be followed in conducting the analysis in the context of a
trans-racial adoption case is far from clear.2 °7
In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,2°8 a plurality took the
view that a statutory scheme setting aside a certain portion of city
contracts for minority businesses should be subjected to strict
scrutiny.2 9 A dissenting group of three Justices took the position
that an intermediate level of scrutiny would suffice.210 The plural-
206 See Perry, supra note 4, at 85; Glynn, supra note 5, at 936-42.
207 See Perry, supra note 4, at 120. Perry argues that conventional affirmative
action based techniques are inappropriate, in part because it cannot be assumed that
the use of racial classification is necessarily beneficial to the child. Id. at 86; see also
infra text accompanying notes 216-33.
208 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
209 Id. at 493. The Court noted that 'the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race.... " Id. Justice Kennedy stated that "any racial prefer-
ence must face the most rigorous scrutiny by the courts." Id. at 519 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia argued that "strict scrutiny must be applied to all govern-
mental classification by race .... Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals 'must
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ity advanced a number of reasons for its position. First, certain
citizens were denied the opportunity to compete for certain con-
tracts by virtue of the preference scheme; thus, race adversely af-
fected their right to be treated with equal dignity and respect.21 '
It is noteworthy that the group prejudiced by the scheme was the
white majority, the same group adversely impacted by the Arkan-
sas statute and the original version of Minnesota's statute, and
likely to be adversely impacted by the now facially race neutral
provisions of both Minnesota's and California's schemes.212
There is one significant analytical difference, however, be-
tween the programs of Richmond and the preference schemes.2 13
As previously mentioned,21 4 with the exception of foster parents,
aspiring parents do not know that a particular child is available
for adoption. That in itself is not offensive and, indeed, may be
desirable. The offensive overtone is generated by the fact that
these schemes place adoption agencies in a situation in which, at
the discretion of the agency, this information is not made avail-
able to a would-be parent because of that parent's race, a practice
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives'") (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 359 (1978)).
211 Id. at 493.
212 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The fact that a statute is now race-neutral does not avoid
the possibility of an equal protection analysis. Id. Indeed, even if all of the prefer-
ences in the Minnesota statute were eliminated, other than the preferred relatives, an
argument could be made that there was a racially discriminatory impact. Although
without more, this would not be fatal, if an examination of the legislative history re-
vealed a discriminatory intent, then even the now overtly race-free statute might still
be vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); see also Glynn, supra note 5, at 936 n.54 (arguing that plaintiff must show
discriminatory intent for equal protection violation). Depending on how one construes
the distribution of burdens and benefits attendant upon a race-based adoption place-
ment, the individuals burdened by the statutory scheme may or may not be members
of a historically victimized class. See O'Brien, supra note 4, at 496.
213 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The concept of
competing to adopt a child sits somewhat uncomfortably alongside the assertion of a
right to compete for a construction contract. But factually and functionally the two
schemes are in some ways similar. In the Richmond scheme, a contract otherwise to
be given to a minority business enterprise could go to a majority enterprise in the
event that qualified minority enterprises were unavailable or unwilling to participate.
Id. at 478-79. Likewise, in Minnesota, a trans-racial adoption placement is permitted
if an in-racial placement is not "feasible." See MmN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West
1992).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 171-80 (stating lower priority adoptive
parents are not aware of availability of child until option of adoptive parents in higher
ranked group is exhausted).
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which surely offends the principle that all citizens are due equal
protection. The public character of the construction bidding proce-
dure stands in stark contrast, laying the foundation for ensuring
the integrity of the administrative process. The "secrecy" of the
adoption process feeds into the propensity for professionals to
"mystify" their craft. It seems inappropriate that racial considera-
tions facilitate this process without at least substantial
justification.2 15
A second reason advanced by the plurality in Croson for
utilizing strict scrutiny was to identify whether the purpose be-
hind the legislation was "benign" or "remedial," or whether it was
to advance illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics. 216 The concept of remedial race-based legislation is fairly
well developed within the context of an equal protection analysis,
although the limiting parameters are somewhat obscure. For ex-
ample, four Justices in Croson were of the opinion that to qualify
as a legitimate remedial scheme the statute must be targeted at
the victims of prior discrimination. 217 Three Justices suggested
that the discrimination must have emanated from the governmen-
tal unit now subjected to the proposed remedial scheme.218
The remedial model of equal protection analysis starts to
come under some pressure when applied to adoption scenarios;
however, the extent of the pressure varies depending on which of
the parties' perspectives one uses. Clearly, it is hard to argue that
a newborn infant has been the victim of prior discrimination. 21 9
This argument may also be difficult to make with respect to an
215 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 317 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that valid purposes of race consciousness do not transcend
harm to those disadvantaged by special preference).
216 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). In re
R.M.G. is one of the few cases in which the constitutional aspects of racial considera-
tions relating to adoption were extensively considered. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 779-
94. However, the court did not reach a majority decision on the relevant issue. Id.
Judge Ferren, writing the lead opinion, came to the conclusion that strict scrutiny
should be applied because historically "in a family-law context... racial classifica-
tions ... have resulted in particularly vivid examples of invidious discrimination." Id.
at 786. These constitutional issues seem to be in something of a "chicken" or "egg"
dilemma. Although the Supreme Court plurality uses strict scrutiny to determine
whether the law is discriminatory, Judge Ferren does so because the law was pre-
sumed to be discriminatory. Id.
217 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508, 517.
218 Id. at 504; see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (noting that Supreme Court "has never
held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification").
219 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Ac-
tion Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 78, 93 (1986). Some make the argument that historical
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older child, unless one accepts the notion that a race-focused
placement of this older child should have been made in the past,
and that the scheme is in place to remedy this deficiency. Even if
this is the analysis, the scheme is unlikely to qualify as remedial
in fact since, unless there is an excess of minority adoptive homes,
the placement of the older child is at the expense of a younger
minority child who, in due course, will simply be a replacement
member of the aggrieved group. Conversely, if the argument is
that the race-based preference structure was enacted for the bene-
fit of minority adoptive families who historically had been discrim-
inated against, the traditional analysis would hold up. Although
it is argued that a white-dominated social work establishment
fails to effectively recruit minority adoptive families,22 ° the prefer-
ence schemes are generally not supported as a remedial device
targeted at this group.221 The victims of the low recruiting are the
minority children who, it is argued, should be placed in a minority
home.222 In any event, conventional wisdom suggests that there
is a surplus of minority children awaiting adoption, so any minor-
ity adoptive parent who is otherwise qualified should be able to
adopt.223
There is currently resistance within the Supreme Court to an-
other justification for a race-conscious scheme that does not de-
pend on discriminatory conduct by any particular governmental
unit. This argument suggests that a scheme may be put in place
discrimination has systematically made blacks a disadvantaged class and, therefore,
every black is a victim. E.g., id.
220 See SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 8-9 (claiming that lack of effort by
predominantly white social workers to recruit black families and use of white, middle-
class standards precludes acceptance of black families); see also Howard, supra note
4, at 513-14 ("Agencies have been criticized for failing to take affirmative steps to
recruit black families ... social and economic criteria imposed by adoption agencies
have been so high that [few] black and Indian families can meet them .... ").
221 See Howard, supra note 4, at 503. "The child placement system in the United
States is governed by the best interests principle: that intervention and placement or
other disposition should be carried out only to further the best interests of the affected
child." Id. (emphasis added).
222 See Perry, supra note 4, at 74.
223 There are assertions that aspirant minority adoptive families were discrimi-
nated against by imposing inappropriate "white" qualification criteria on them. How-
ever, the preference schemes as such would not be the remedy for this manifestation
of discrimination. A change in the qualifications for acceptability would be a remedy,
and there is some indication that agencies are now inclined to adjust their standards
when minority adoptive parents are involved. Parenthetically, it might be noted that
if this adjustment is inappropriate, the victims of the discriminatory process are once
again the minority children.
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to offset the consequences of general "societal discrimination."22 4
In Croson, a plurality of four Justices rejected the idea that "socie-
tal discrimination" would be available to support a race-based
classification.225 The precise parameters of societal discrimina-
tion are not clear. Arguably, however, the proposition that minor-
ity children should be placed with minority families in order to
provide those children with the foundation to cope with racism in
the external world would be legitimized by the acceptance of a so-
cietal discrimination theory. To some extent, this is an analog of
the argument advanced unsuccessfully in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education226 that minority teachers should not be laid off
in order to ensure that appropriate role models remained for the
students.22 7 The analogy is at best only a partial one. Although
one of the objects of the role model theory was to provide examples
to minority children,228 another view was that the minority teach-
ers were there for the benefit of the majority children to enable
them to learn that "the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national
backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous 'melt-
ing pot' do not identify essential differences among the human be-
ings that inhabit our land."229
One reason why an analysis on the basis of societal discrimi-
nation floundered in Wygant was that it was not possible to ade-
quately tie the remedial structure to the underlying problem.23 0
Whether a race-conscious preference scheme in adoption cases
could surmount this hurdle is unclear. Is it a prerequisite to over-
come the consequences of a racially discriminatory society that the
individual who is a member of the oppressed minority should have
a developed racial identity, or would it be sufficient for this indi-
vidual to possess a self-concept or identity which does not neces-
sarily embody a strong racial underpinning? If the latter, the
preference scheme might not be necessary at all, for there is evi-
dence that it is possible for a child placed trans-racially to develop
224 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978).
225 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,497, 505 (1989); see Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (asserting that Supreme Court
"never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial
classification").
226 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
227 Id. at 275-76.
228 Id. at 274.
229 Id. at 315.
230 Id. at 274-75.
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a self-concept.231 If the racially oriented placement is not neces-
sary, the scheme would fail a strict scrutiny test which requires
that the means employed be "closely tailored" to the goal232 in or-
der to avoid the gratuitous injection of race-based classifica-
tions.233 The scheme would also fail on a constitutional basis even
if it were established that a strong racial identity was desirable,
unless it could also be established that an individual of a different
race was incapable of fostering the development of such an iden-
tity. In this regard, the Arkansas, Minnesota, and California stat-
utory schemes appear to author their own constitutional demise,
since they envisage that persons of another race who are knowl-
edgeable and appreciative of, or sensitive to, the child's racial and
ethnic heritage may be considered as adoptive parents, albeit
later in the order of preference.2 34
Consideration must be given to one final aspect of a require-
ment that the legislature's devices be necessary and closely ta-
ilored to meet the legislation's goals. Apart from the fact that op-
erationally, either by interpretation of the courts or within an
administrative agency, such a preference is likely to become an
irrebuttable presumption,235 in a context which in any event re-
quires an individualized, factor-by-factor evaluation, what justifi-
cation can be advanced for employing a sweeping preference
scheme? If the preference scheme is truly targeted at identifying
people with desirable qualifications, how can it be argued that it is
constitutionally permissible, given a requirement to use necessary
close-tailored means, to employ proxy terminology in a scheme
in which various proxies are ranked expressly or implicitly by
race? At what point does such a preference scheme tend to sug-
gest that the proxies have attributes which, while politically desir-
able, are not functionally necessary and thus constitutionally
unacceptable?
Even if it were argued that the same race preference category
was created as an administrative device for identifying a potential
231 See supra note 67; see also Howard, supra note 4, at 536 ("The studies indicate
that transracially adopted children, generally speaking, experience good emotional
development.").
232 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). "[Ilt is almost
impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior
discrimination since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any way." Id. at
507.
233 Id. at 493.
234 See supra text accompanying note 45.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
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group of individuals who would be appropriately "knowledgeable
and appreciative" or "sensitive,"2" 6 a strict scrutiny test would dis-
pose of this position for at least two reasons. First, in the context
of a strict scrutiny analysis, an argument of administrative con-
venience is apparently untenable.2 3 Second, the use of race as a
device for identifying people with certain characteristics is gener-
ally frowned on in the context of a constitutional analysis because
of the propensity to further racial stereotyping.238 Within a race-
based adoption preference scheme, this stereotyping question can
be analyzed from three points of view. First, that the minority
adoptive parent is endowed with certain characteristics-the abil-
ity to inculcate in the child a racial identity and the ability to deal
with the consequences of a racist world.239 Second, that all major-
ity adoptive parents lack these skills, 240 along with the implicit
notion that, at least passively, they manifest the racism of the
broader society.241 Third, that all minority children raised in a
minority family have those characteristics which the race-based
preference scheme foresees minority adoptive parents will pass on
to any minority child they adopt.
The above three points would be applicable to a raced-based
preference even if the preference related exclusively to minority
children. The real threat of the Minnesota and California prefer-
ence schemes is that the schemes are applicable to the adoption of
children of all races. The source of disquiet with the schemes sur-
236 See Perry, supra note 4. The author maintains that intra-racial adoptions "ob-
viously" have possible benefits such as a sharing of personal experiences and trans-
mitting needed survival skills in racist situations. Id. at 110. In addition, the author
recognizes arguments that "Afro-centric" or "black family values" can only be trans-
mitted in a black family setting. Id. at 114. These recognized generalizations can also
add to administrative convenience by narrowing the variety of placement options, but
the author concludes that a race-free placement process is administratively conve-
nient. Id. at 124-25.
237 Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 ("[T]he interest in avoiding the bureaucratic effort
necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who fully have suffered the effects of prior
discrimination cannot justify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classifica-
tion." (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973)).
238 Id. at 494 ("'[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.'" (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978))).
239 See Perry, supra note 4, at 110; Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *6-*7 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
240 See Chimezie, supra note 72, at 299.
241 See Chimezie, supra note 72, at 300; see also Perry, supra note 4, at 84 (dis-
cussing relationship between stereotyping and stigmatization).
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faces when one realizes that they also require that administrative
agencies and the courts search for parents who by clear implica-
tion are expected to be knowledgeable and appreciative of the
child's racial or ethnic heritage, with at minimum a conceptual
view that those adoptive parents inculcate a racial identity into
the child. In such cases, the underlying premise used to justify
the development of such schemes in the interests of minority chil-
dren do not exist.242 In the standard analytical model, a majority
race child does not need special skills or a unique racial self-per-
ception in order to cope with minority oppression.24 3 Finally, in
this context, other premises advanced by the National Association
of Black Social Workers for adopting a race-centered placement
system move concern from the level of disquiet to the level of acute
alarm if the system were truly implemented on a race-neutral ba-
sis. Do we need our young white children to begin at birth to iden-
tify with all white people in a white community, and are those
white children needed to build a strong white nation?244
A "strict scrutiny" analysis requires that the question of plac-
ing the child with a family on a racial basis be considered from
another perspective. In order to pass constitutional muster, the
preference scheme must advance a "compelling" state interest.24 5
In the context of a race-conscious adoptive placement, this issue
becomes somewhat murky. Not infrequently, the state's compel-
ling interest is seen as advancing the best interests of the child.246
In this regard, an adoption preference scheme is merely a means
to a constitutionally legitimate end. This means, however, does
not exist in isolation. The law accepts that a variety of factors are
relevant to the child's best interests. One example is the existence
of a stable family environment. If the effect of insisting on the
enforcement of a race-specific placement is such that it requires
242 See Perry, supra note 4, at 121-23.
243 See Perry, supra note 4, at 122.
244 See supra text accompanying note 27.
245 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 505 (referring to whether legislative body is "pur-
suing a goal important enough" or "[is] demonstrat[ing] a compelling interest" to jus-
tify using such a "highly suspect tool").
246 See, e.g., In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 786, 802 (D.C. 1982) (stating that court
implicitly treats advancement of child's best interests as "compelling" government in-
terest); see also J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating racial and
cultural needs consistent with best interest are compelling government interests); De-
Wees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating racial classification of
foster parents survives equal protection challenge only if necessary to achieve compel-
ling state interest) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
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the child to be institutionalized or moved from foster home to fos-
ter home on an indefinite basis, then at some point, the preference
scheme has ceased to be a "means" and has become the end in its
own right.2 47 At that point, it becomes very difficult to argue that
the state has a "compelling" interest in seeing that a child has a
secure racial identity, at least vis-a-vis the interests of the child,
and perhaps even from the broader perspective of society. Fur-
ther, to the extent that arguments in favor of race-specific adop-
tion placements advanced to avoid a trans-racial placement which
is perceived as part of a racial or cultural "genocide" program, or
to build a strong "nation" out of a minority group,248 the preserva-
tion or advancement of a racial group becomes the end. At this
juncture, a state's "compelling interest" position becomes untena-
ble, at least under traditional "modern" theories of constitutional
law.249 Of course, the last two points highlight the fact that legal
issues associated with trans-racial adoption placements pose some
fundamental questions for the legal system on the social values it
wishes to espouse.
b. Intermediate Scrutiny
Up to this stage, the discussion has focused on the strict scru-
tiny analysis established to remedy the consequences of prior dis-
crimination; however, even within this framework there are voices
which suggest that strict scrutiny is not required. Thus, three
Justices in Croson would adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny
in which race-conscious classifications designed to further reme-
dial goals would survive scrutiny if they served important govern-
mental objectives and were substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives. 250 This test would perhaps assist the
constitutionality of a race-based adoption preference scheme in
permitting race to be used as a proxy for identifying those people
with the parenting skills which the scheme purports to pursue.
247 See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 876
F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989). This case involved a two year foster care placement which
was changed solely on the grounds of the foster parents race. The change was found to
violate the original foster parents' equal protection rights. Id. at 324.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 2, 27.
249 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 510 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to root
out "simple racial politics").
250 Id. at 535, 548 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun,
J.) (noting that race-conscious classifications must serve 'important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
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Further, assuming that the "best interests of the child" were still
the "end," the substantial relationship analysis might permit the
use of a race-based placement without having to demonstrate that
a placement based on race was "necessary" to achieve that end.
Interestingly, there are even echoes in the halls of constitu-
tional law which suggest that an intermediate level of scrutiny
might tolerate a different "end," for instance, the reinforcement of
social diversity.251 Certainly, a majority of the Supreme Court
has accepted that Congress may enact "benign" race-focused legis-
lation that is not necessarily aimed at remedying prior discrimina-
tion.252 Unfortunately, for those who would like to pursue this po-
tential line of development, the most recent plurality of the Court
on the issue has recognized that "race-conscious classifications
adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination
are subject to a different standard than such classifications pre-
scribed by state and local governments,"25 3 apparently on the ba-
sis that such classifications would be more prone to abuse in the
states.254 Tribe observes that an earlier plurality in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke255 would have accepted a state-
originated race-conscious program and subjected it to intermedi-
ate scrutiny when: (1) no fundamental right was involved; (2) the
disadvantaged class did not have the traditional indicia of sus-
pectness to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process; (3) race was relevant to the goal
251 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (maintaining goal of race-based "broadcast diversity" was acceptable).
252 Id. at 563.
253 Id. at 565.
254 Id. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, cited earlier comments from Jus-
tice Scalia to the effect that the "Federal Government [sic] is unlikely to be captured
by minority racial or ethnic groups and used as an instrument of discrimination." Id.
at 566. Justice Scalia also noted that there is a "'heightened danger of oppression
from political factions in small, rather than large, political units.'" Id. (quoting
Croson, 488 U.S. at 522-23).
In this regard, even if an intermediate level of scrutiny was applied to benign
goals advanced by a state, courts might well be leery of systems which delegate sub-
stantial discretionary decision-making power based on race to the depths of an admin-
istrative infrastructure, vesting the effective authority in some small administrative
sub-unit. Thus, it is not surprising that Judge Ferren, in In re R.M.G. 454 A.2d 776
(D.C. 1982), after noting that the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment,
applied to the District of Columbia, and that the Fifth Amendment did not contain an
equal protection clause, nevertheless concluded that it was unthinkable that the Con-
stitution would impose a lesser duty on the federal government than the Fourteenth
Amendment demanded of the states. Id. at 784 n.10.
255 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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sought; and (4) the classification was not based on a presumption
of racial inferiority and did not promote racial hatred or
separatism.256
Passing over any concerns that these schemes might impli-
cate a fundamental right of freedom of association,257 or some
other unidentified right, attributable to aspiring parents of any
race, or the child, there might be some debate whether the minor-
ity child was being disadvantaged by the majority political
processes. Obviously, majority adoptive parents would not have
the hallmarks of a discrete and insular minority that an equal
protection analysis sets out to protect. This is not necessarily true
of minority children, however, even when the pressure for the
preference scheme would seem to originate within the minority
adult community. It would still be discriminatory for the majority
political process to abandon concern for the child in implementing
a scheme to accommodate broader political goals of the minority
adult community. This theme harkens back to the earlier discus-
sion of who speaks for the child and whose interest is truly being
served in the process.258 Further, there would be concerns as to
256 See TRIE, supra note 143, at 1530 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357). Judge New-
man dissented in In re R.M.G., taking the view that an intermediate level of scrutiny
was to be applied because the consideration of race in the context of an adoption pro-
ceeding was "benign." In re R.M.G. 454 A-2d at 800 (Newman, J., dissenting). The
application was benign because (a) it did not use racial factors to stigmatize a particu-
lar group-it was not based on the presumption that one race was inferior to another
and it did not cause the court to endorse racial bigotry and separatism; and (b) its
purpose and effect was not 'pernicious with respect to the distribution of burdens and
benefits among racial groups'-its purpose was not to improve the position of any
racial group, "but simply to protect the best interests of the child." Id.
Meanwhile, Judge Newman wrote that, if it emerged that "appropriate race-con-
scious factors" were being manipulated to achieve invidious goals, then strict scrutiny
should be applied. Id. at 801 (Newman, J., dissenting); see Perry, supra note 4, at 60,
76-80, 119 (arguing that if potential adoptive parents do not have existing relation-
ship with child, there cannot be stigmatization for constitutional law purposes). The
basis of this argument is not clear. Does constitutional law require that a particular
person will be stigmatized by the invocation of a racial classification? Is it not suffi-
cient if a group will be stigmatized? Or, is stigmatization just one manifestation of
victimization which, under current analysis, the Supreme Court seems to suggest
must be personal? See supra text accompanying notes 218-19, 238-40.
The Fifth Circuit in Drummond seems to imply that a provision cannot be stig-
matizing if its sole purpose is legitimate. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family
and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977). This approach would help
validate a race-based preference statute if its sole purpose was perceived as advanc-
ing the best interests of the child. The earlier analysis supra suggests that this re-
quirement could not be met. See supra text accompanying notes 52-141.
257 See TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1478.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 191-200.
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the relevancy of race in achieving the "best interests" goal, either
with respect to the need for the parent to be of a particular race, or
even more fundamentally with whether the child needs to develop
a racial identity.259 This issue implicates the final component of
the four-part test: At what point does the reinforcement of a ra-
cial identity promote racial hatred or separatism?
V. AFTER THE "MELTING POT"
Trans-racial adoption is an issue that forces the legal commu-
nity to address what is to be expected from the Constitution. Is it
an instrument of social aspiration or social accommodation, or can
it be both?
In Palmore v. Sidoti,260 the Court unequivocally accepted the
premise that the operating principles of the Constitution should
not bow to the pressures of social realities, no matter what price
the participants in the underlying social drama are called upon to
pay.261 It is an appropriate perspective for an institution as lofty
as the nation's highest court, for if it cannot sound the clarion call
of aspiration, who might?
But, the call is muted in the legal trenches. Some courts de-
liberately avoid a response; distinction is the order of the day.
262
Others, sensitive to the aspirations, abandon them to the accom-
modations. Thus,
[Tihe court.., is concerned that the very problems which give
rise to race-related concerns may unintentionally be exacerbated
by overemphasizing them. It is difficult to make race irrelevant,
as it should be, if adoption and other social decisions are driven
by racial considerations, however benign.
In making adoption decisions, state agencies cannot ignore the
realities of the society in which children entrusted to them for
placement will be raised, or the affect on children of those reali-
ties as documented by professional studies. The court would
hope, however, that these agencies also will be mindful of the
possibility that an overemphasis on racial issues may retard ef-
forts to achieve a color blind society, and of the need to avoid
259 See supra text accompanying notes 68-77.
260 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
261 Id. at 433-34. In Palmore, the Supreme Court held that although the lifestyle
chosen by a mother was unacceptable to the child's father, the father's private biases
would not be given effect by the Constitution. Id. at 433.




even the appearance that an adoption decision may have been
based on race per se.
26 3
The struggle between values and realities is reflected in a
parallel debate over the nature of legal analytical theories and de-
vices and the relationship of these to the social realities. One
judge has described an aspect of the problem this way:
If the possibility of invidious discrimination in the same context
is all that is necessary to bar intermediate scrutiny-regardless
of the fact that the actual consideration of race was clearly be-
nign-then such scrutiny is never possible. That approach
would place too extreme an impediment to benign and important
uses of color consciousness. Unless and until the promised land
of racial equality is achieved, it is unrealistic to blind ourselves
to color in such instances.
264
The concern, however, must be that the mere presence of these
theories and devices will reinforce the negative underlying social
values that were the original source of the problem. As Justice
Powell stated in a context outside of trans-racial adoption:
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination
in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory
legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal dis-
crimination is insufficient and over expansive .... [A] court could
uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and
timeless in their ability to affect the future.2 6 5
In this regard, race-based preference structures must give
great cause for concern, both as to the schemes themselves and
the visions of society of the schemes' drafters. Not only do the
schemes purport to respond to the consequences of racism in soci-
ety, but they are calculated to ensure that the children placed for
adoption under the auspices of the scheme will anticipate a racist
society in the future, and as likely as not, will in due course pro-
duce a generation of children of the same mindset. Implicitly, the
schemes do not accept the "melting pot" as a viable model of soci-
ety. From the perspective of the National Association of Black So-
cial Workers, "[t]he United States is not a melting pot. It never
263 DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
264 In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 800-01 (D.C. 1982).
265 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); see Davis v. Hal-
pern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that law school's remedial pow-
ers do not extend to addressing discrimination by society at large).
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has been, and it's not going to be."266 From this point of view, the
preference schemes probably reflect the minimum legal acknowl-
edgement due the social reality. Others who accept the racism of
society would still see the schemes, with their emphasis on ethnic-
ity and race, as going too far, for in their view, "[i]f you are talking
about the melting pot, on the whole we are a melted society...
ethnicity isn't very important any more, and race is terribly
important."267
If the "melting pot" model does indeed prove to be an empty
crock, reflecting unachievable aspirations rather than temporarily
intransigent social realities, then there will be substantial ramifi-
cations for the longer term constitutional treatment of trans-racial
adoptions. The long-term strength of the Constitution depends on
such structural and philosophical integrity as its applications en-
dow it. Equally, constitutional viability depends on operational
credibility. Can such credibility be achieved using a nonviable so-
cial model? Correspondingly, can constitutional interpretation af-
ford to pay the price of letting the genie of race-based nationalism
out of the bottle, having spent the better part of two centuries en-
gaged in the enterprise of bottling this very genie? As Justice Ste-
vens has put it:
A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further the
national goal of equal opportunity for all our citizens. In order to
achieve that goal we must learn from our past mistakes, but I
believe the Constitution requires us to evaluate our policy deci-
sions-including those that govern the relationships among dif-
ferent racial and ethnic groups-primarily by studying their
probable impact on the future.268
In this regard, does the specific problem environment of
trans-racial adoption justify abandoning the fundamental premise
of a legal system based on race-free classifications?
Palmore v. Sidoti269 is an important case. Its technical appli-
cation may be limited and it may shrug aside its own impact on
the best interests of a given child. Nevertheless, it represents a
large philosophical footprint of constitutional law. When the issue
of race-based preferences reaches the United States Supreme
266 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 9 (quoting Black Children Facing
Adoption Barriers, NASW NEws, Apr. 1984, at 9).
267 SIMON & ALTSTEIN III, supra note 11, at 10 (quoting Herbert Gans, A Place for
Foster Children, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1984, at C15).
268 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989).
269 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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Court, as it ultimately will, the locus of that footprint may be re-
vealed, be it granite or lily-pad.
CONCLUSION
The race-based adoption preference schemes should be viewed
as highly problematic devices employed in a politically contentious
environment. In the face of what seems to be a substantial need
for adoptive homes by minority children, the schemes take the
posture that the preferred placement for a minority child is a mi-
nority home, although the social science evidence in this regard is
far from conclusive. The schemes' position appears to be that the
best interests of the child will be met by such a placement, even
though the price of the scheme may be delay in the placement,
disruption of existing relationships, and even the possibility of no
placement at all. The schemes endow the social service infrastruc-
ture with substantial discretionary decision-making authority
when the premise for the exercise of that authority is race and the
adequacy of legal review is open to question.
The preference system impacts on the potential interests of a
variety of different constituencies, not all of whom are legally ap-
propriately situated to deal with the consequences of the scheme.
Particularly disadvantaged in this regard are the adoptee child
and any foster parents. Although the definitive basis for the eval-
uation of the constitutionality of such a scheme is unclear, it
seems both likely and necessary for a strict scrutiny analysis to be
applied. The three current state schemes are unlikely to survive
such scrutiny, although the schemes' prospects might be better if
an intermediate level of scrutiny were employed.
In summary, a child affected by the question of trans-racial
adoption is potentially trapped in the middle of dangerous polit-
ical and legal crossroads. The interests involved in selecting the
path down which to travel are not necessarily the child's. As
usual, adults with agendas of their own are the ones to speak. At
issue, apart from any concern for the child, are questions of race,
social polarization, bigotry, uncertainty in the social sciences, and
the processes and values of the legal system. A race-based system
of adoption placement priorities emerges as a dubious legal in-
strument with marginal, if any, benefits for the child, and if sanc-
tioned, as an instrument which requires rethinking some of the
fundamental normative values underpinning constitutional law.
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